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UNDERSTANDING OF INTENTIONALITY IN CHILDREN WITH WILLIAMS 
SYNDROME AND DOWN SYNDROME 
 
This dissertation examined the development of the understanding of intentionality in two 
different neurogenetic disorders, Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS).  The 
study of intentionality focuses on how children come to understand the intentions of others.  
Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral reenactment paradigm is a nonverbal procedure wherein a child is 
presented with a series of objects.  Prior to each presentation, the examiner either performs a 
successful action (e.g. the target action) or an unsuccessful action (e.g. the failed intentional 
action).  A child’s understanding of intentionality is assessed by their ability to interpret the 
experimenter’s intention during failed attempt trials, and their subsequent completion of the task.  
This examination of intentionality was divided into two studies.  
Study 1 was designed to test Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s (2000) hypothesis that there 
is a dissociation between social-perceptual abilities and social-cognitive abilities in individuals 
with Williams syndrome.  In order to explore this dissociation, the behavioral reenactment 
procedure was administered with and without experimenter affective cues.  Participants were 25 
children with a confirmed diagnosis of WS.  There were two groups of WS, one that received 
affective cues (N=13) and one that did not (N=12).   Also, children with WS in the no affect 
group were compared to 12 mental-age matched children with developmental disabilities.  The 
findings of this study indicates that the understanding of intentionality improves with 
developmental status in children with WS.  Also, this study indicates that there may be a 
  
 iii 
dissociation between social-perceptual and social-cognitive skills in this population during early 
social-emotional development.  Specifically, it seems that the presence of emotional cues during 
intersubjective tasks leads to an emotional response instead of a response based on social 
cognition.   
Study 2 was motivated by past research suggesting that children with DS demonstrate 
deficits in some aspects of social cognition, even though many children with DS have strengths 
in other aspects of social-emotional functioning.  Therefore, it is likely that the understanding of 
intentionality in children with Down syndrome may be influenced by other foundational 
cognitive abilities (i.e. joint attention and affect sharing in early childhood and executive 
functioning in middle childhood).  Participants were 40 children with a confirmed diagnosis of 
Down syndrome, 16 young children with DS and 24 older children with DS.  In addition, the 16 
young children with DS were compared to 16 mental-age matched children with other 
developmental disabilities.  The results of this study suggests that the understanding of 
intentionality improves with developmental status for young children with DS.  This study also 
suggest that difficulties in joint attention and EF lead children with DS to miss the target relevant 
information during the behavioral reenactment procedure leading them to perform more “other 
actions”.   
 This dissertation is the first study to examine the development of intentionality in WS and 
DS.  From these studies, it may be possible to begin to characterize how the understanding of 
intentionality develops in children with WS and DS.  Characterizing social cognition in WS and 
DS will help to identify areas for targeted intervention to prevent the possible cascading effects 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Theory of the mind is the social cognitive milestone that allows humans “to predict and 
explain other people’s actions based on inferences about their mental states such as intentions, 
knowledge, or beliefs” (Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2007, p. 97).  Theory of mind is 
critical for navigating complex social dynamics and interactions because this skill allows 
individuals to theorize about what another person is thinking and take their perspective (Zinck, 
2008).  According to Meltzoff (1995), a child’s earliest understanding of theory of mind begins 
with reasoning about mental states like desires and intentions.  The study of intentionality 
focuses on if and when children are able to understand the intentions of others (Meltzoff, 1995).  
Two populations that may exhibit unique development of the understanding of others’ intentions 
are children with Williams syndrome (WS) and children with Down syndrome (DS) because of 
the unique social cognitive profiles associated with each syndrome.   
Research Problem  
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the understanding of intentionality in 
children with WS and DS, and whether these two syndromes predispose children to specific 
areas of strength or challenge in this area.  In order to examine the understanding of 
intentionality in these two groups, Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral reenactment procedure was 
used.  The behavioral reenactment procedure is a nonverbal experimental paradigm where a child 
is presented with a series of objects.  Prior to each presentation, the examiner either performs a 
successful action (e.g. the target action), such as putting beads in to a cup, or an unsuccessful 
action (e.g. the failed intentional action/failed attempt), such as trying, but failing to put beads in 




Study 1 was designed to test Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s (2000) hypothesis that there 
is a dissociation between social-perceptual abilities and social-cognitive abilities in individuals 
with WS when performing theory of mind tasks.  The understanding of intentionality involves 
both social-perceptual and social cognitive skills.  Social-perceptual skills include understanding 
and responding to nonverbal behaviors (such as directing facial expressions, directing 
vocalizations, responsive smiling, and shared affect) that involve dynamic matching and 
adapting to another’s behaviors (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  Social-cognitive skills are 
thought to be an extension of social-perceptual skills and include the abilities involved in the 
traditional conceptualization of theory of mind (e.g. shared and coordinated attention to an object 
or event, perspective taking, the attribution of mental states, etc.; Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).   
Young children with WS have been shown to demonstrate heightened levels of emotional 
responsivity and are more likely to imitate the emotional displays of their social partner (Fidler et 
al., 2007).  However, previous studies have shown that knowledge of a social partner’s emotions 
does not appear to inform social decision making in many young children with WS (e.g. giving a 
disliked food even after the dislike has been indicated; Fidler et al., 2007).  This suggests that 
children with WS may have difficulties taking the perspectives of others, despite being 
responsive to affective cues.  Thus, there is evidence of a dissociation in social-perceptual 
abilities and social-cognitive abilities during childhood in this population (Fidler et al., 2007; 
Hepburn et al., 2011).  Because understanding intentionality involves both social-perceptual and 
social-cognitive skills, characterizing skills in both areas in children with WS will further 
describe the proposed dissociation between these domains.  For this study, the behavioral 




dissociation between social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities in young children with WS.  
If this dissociation is evident in the understanding of intentionality, then children with WS who 
receive affective cues should attend more to the emotional information presented during the task 
and miss the necessary social-cognitive information needed to successfully complete the task.  
Study 2 was motivated by past research suggesting that children with DS demonstrate 
deficits in some aspects of social cognition, even though many children with DS have strengths 
in other aspects of social-emotional functioning (Fidler, 2006).  Based on existing work, it is 
unclear whether the understanding of intentionality is compromised in children with DS beyond 
the level of understanding that would be expected for their mental age (MA).  In addition, the 
competent development of the understanding of intentionality in children with DS may be 
influenced by other related cognitive and social cognitive abilities.  In early childhood, it is 
possible that skills related to intersubjectivity, like joint attention and affect sharing, are 
correlated to the understanding of intentionality.  Infants with DS achieve the developmental 
milestones related to primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity at MA appropriate 
levels (Fidler, 2006).  The development of both primary and secondary intersubjectivity includes 
the development of joint attention and affect sharing.  Joint attention occurs when individuals 
engage in a reciprocal interaction around an object or event (Mundy & Newell, 2007).  Affect 
sharing is a combination of a joint attention behavior and emotional signals (Seibert, Hogan & 
Mundy, 1982; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990).   
For older children with DS, the understanding of intentionality may be related to 
executive function skills.  Research on adults with DS suggests that theory of mind skills are 
positively related to their executive function skills (Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, & Frye, 1996).  




processes integral to adaptive, goal-directed actions, including working memory, inhibition, 
shifting, and planning (Blair, Zelazo, & Greenberg, 2005; Carlson, 2005).  Although the 
relationship between executive function skills and theory of mind abilities has been examined in 
adults with DS (Zelazo et al., 1996) and typically developing children (Carlson, Mandell, & 
Williams, 2004a; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004b; Hughes, & Ensor, 2007; Rakoczy, 2010), 
this relationship has yet to be examined in children with DS.  It is possible that executive 
function abilities may be related to intentionality because successful completion of the target 
action involves planning regarding the proper completion of the action based on the failed 
intentional information they observed (by using working memory).  Also, during the 
intentionality task children with DS may need to inhibit any processes telling them to imitate 
what was observed.       
For this study, performance on the behavioral reenactment procedure of young children 
with DS was compared to that of older children with DS.  In addition, the performance of 
children with DS on the behavioral reenactment procedure was compared to that of children with 
other developmental disabilities (DD).  Finally, the relationship between the performance on the 
behavioral reenactment procedure and joint attention, affect sharing, and executive functioning 
was explored.    
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Study 1 
1. Is there a dissociation between social-perceptual and social-cognitive abilities in WS? 
a. Children with WS who receive affective cues in the administration of the 




and will imitate the failed intention more on the failed intention administration 
than children with WS who do not receive affective cues.   
b. Children with WS who do not receive affective cues will perform more target 
actions on the failed intention administration than children with WS who receive 
affective cues.   
c. When compared to children with DD, children with WS will imitate the failed 
intention more. 
d. There will be an increased likelihood of affective responses for children with WS 
who experienced affective cues when compared to children with WS who do not 
receive affective cues. 
2. What are the magnitudes of the association between chronological age, nonverbal-
mental age, and mental age on task performance in children with WS? 
a. Developmental status (chronological age, nonverbal-mental age, and mental age) 
will be positively correlated with performance of the target action on the failed 
intention administration. 
b. Developmental status (chronological age, nonverbal-mental age, and mental age) 
will be negatively correlated with imitating the failed intention on the failed 
intention administration. 
Study 2 
1. What are the magnitudes of the associations between task performance and other 
domains of cognition in children with DS? 
a. The task performance of younger children with DS will be correlated with joint 




b. The task performance of older children with DS on this task will correlate with 
executive function skills.   
2. What are the age-related changes in the understanding intentionality in children with 
DS?  Are the age-related changes similar or different from children with other 
developmental disabilities (DD)? 
a. The understanding of intentionality in children with DS will improve with 
developmental status (chronological age, nonverbal-mental age, and mental age). 
b. Performance on the intentionality task will be similar between young children 
with DS and young children with DD. 
List of Keywords 
Social Cognition – ability to think and reason about the social world (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; 
Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). This involves a wide range of abilities 
including interaction and social referencing, social attribution, interpretation of cues, face 
recognition, communication, and theory of mind (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006). 
 
Theory of Mind – the understanding that other minds exist, this ability allows humans “to 
predict and explain other people’s actions based on inferences about their mental states such as 
intentions, knowledge, or beliefs” (Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2007, p. 97).   
 
Intentionality – understanding the intentional of actions of others (Meltzoff, 1995).  
 
Williams syndrome – a neurogenetic disorder caused by a deletion on chromosome 7 that 




aspects of social functioning and relative weaknesses in spatial cognition and visual spatial 
processing. 
 
Down syndrome – a neurogenetic disorder caused by an extra copy of the 21
st
 chromosome that 
results in a behavioral phenotype characterized by relative strengths in visual short-term 
memory, receptive language, and some aspects of social functioning and relative weakness in 
areas related to communication and verbal short-term memory.  
Researchers Perspective 
 My training has positioned me to be a post-positivist and for many years I did not 
question this approach, but as my understanding of research methodology and theory has grown, 
so has my understanding of post-positivism.  Although there are aspects of the paradigm I do not 
completely agree with, the metaphysics of the paradigm lend themselves well to my research on 
neurogenetic disorders (e.g. Down syndrome and Williams syndrome).  The field of 
neurogenetic disorders is focused on identifying the characteristics associated with various 
genetic causes of intellectual disability.  The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the 
development of intentionality in children with WS and DS.  Therefore, the most appropriate 
perspective to design this study from is post-positivism because of the underlying assumptions of 
the paradigm, which includes the ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, and teleology. 
 According to Guba (1990), ontology is what makes for reality.  In post-positivism, there 
is the understanding that reality exists, but it can never be truly attained (Guba, 1990); 
nonetheless, as researchers we do the best we can to understand it (Green, 1990).  Nonetheless, 
as researchers from this paradigm we do the best we can.  When it comes to neurogenetic 




individual, which means these problems are originating from a genetic trait and not social 
construction.  For that reason, the post-positivistic view of ontology is an appropriate stance for 
research into neurogenetic disorders.   
 What makes for knowledge of reality (Guba, 1990), or the epistemology, from a post-
positivist perspective is based on the generation of scientific facts developed from observation 
and logic, with an emphasis on objectivity (Merriam, 1991).  Thus the methodology of post-
positivism, or how knowledge is accumulated (Guba, 1990), takes the form of modified 
experiments that are conducted in more natural settings, but still use statistics to approximate 
reality (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).  When it comes to the issue of objectivity we strive to be 
objective as possible, but we are far from the traditional notion of the disinterested scientist.  For 
example, we take an objective stance in collecting our data by following protocols for the 
administration and coding of the tasks we are studying.  However, we also put the needs of the 
child and family above our own goals as researchers, in order to establish rapport and make sure 
the families are getting what they need from these visits with us.  Although we want to gather 
information in order to inform the field, our ultimate goal is to promote well-being in these 
children and their families, which means we are far from disinterested scientists.  Nonetheless, 
we are still conducting experiments with these children following the basic ideals of the 
scientific method, which aligns with the axiology of post-positivism.      
 Axiology is how we, as researchers, act in producing and applying knowledge (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005).  Knowledge is produced via the scientific method in post-positivism (Merriam, 
1991), which involves propositional knowing (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).  Propositional knowing is 
the understanding that the world is an end in itself, but we will never come to know it completely 




approach used in this dissertation to understand development in neurogenetic disorders (Dykens, 
1995).  The probabilistic approach is the idea that although we have identified certain behaviors 
and outcomes (i.e. behavioral phenotypes) for individuals with neurogenetic disorders, not all 
individuals with a specific disorder will display all these characteristics and behaviors (Dykens, 
1995).  In DS, for example, the behavioral phenotype is influenced by the context of the child 
(e.g. parenting styles, types of intervention, available resources, etc.) and the type of genetic 
abnormality (i.e. trisomy 21, translocation, or mosaicism).      
 Finally, the teleology, or how knowledge is applied (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), focuses on 
producing objective, scientific explanations (Merriam, 1991).   Although this research is 
producing explanations about the development of individuals with neurogenetic disorders, it is 
not the only way this research is being applied.  Our research is also used to promote well-being, 
develop interventions, and add information to practice and policy.  Therefore this research is 
taking the next natural step in post-positivism by applying knowledge practically, not just 













CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social cognition involves the ability to think and reason about the social world (Cebula & 
Wishart, 2008; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  Social cognitive skills 
influence many other areas of development (Bukowski et al., 1996, Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; 
Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Flavell et al., 2002) and have “implications for learning, for making 
friendships, and ultimately for social emotional well-being and quality of life” (Cebula & 
Wishart, 2008, p. 45).  Within social cognition, researchers have studied numerous phenomena, 
including social referencing, social attribution, interpretation of cues, face recognition, 
communication, and the ability to understand the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of others 
(Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006).   
From a developmental perspective, social cognition depends on interactions between the 
self and others, and begins in infancy with primary and secondary intersubjectivity (Meltzoff, 
Gopnik, & Repacholi, 1999).  These early intersubjective skills serve as a foundation for more 
advanced social cognitive skills (i.e. understanding of intentions, theory of mind, social decision 
making) that allow humans to think, reason, and interact in the social world (Cebula & Wishart, 
2008; Meltzoff, 2007 Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  Specifically, the 
development of intersubjectivity provides young children with the skills needed to understand 
the intentions of others (Trevarthen, 1978; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) and, in turn, the 
understanding of the intentions of others supports the development of theory of mind (Meltzoff, 
2007; 1995).  Therefore, to understand the development of intentionality in children with WS 
and DS, we first must review what is known about intersubjectivity and intentionality in 






Intersubjectivity is the intuitive recognition and understanding of the impulses and 
desires of another’s mind (Trevarthen, 1978).  The first signs of social understanding develop 
during infancy, involving emotional displays and affect sharing between the infant and caregiver 
during reciprocal interactions (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  At 2 months, infants and caregivers 
actively participate in mutually regulated, dynamic interactions.  This includes taking turns 
initiating and responding to the feelings and interests that are being displayed by each social 
partner during a social interaction (Trevarthen, 1979).  These interactions serve as a foundation 
for the development of primary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979).  From these interactions, an 
infant begins to predict what their social partner knows and what they will do, and they begin to 
share mental control of social interactions with another person (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).   
By the middle of the first year, infant interests in objects increases with their use of 
protoconversations, leading to more elaborate games with objects (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  
Joint attention emerges before the end of the first year, which is instigated by a shift in infants 
attention to their surroundings and the world (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979), and has tremendous 
consequences for learning by changing the way caregivers interact with their infant (Trevarthen 
& Aitken, 2001).  The emergence of joint attention leads to two types of awareness, one for 
objects and one for people (Trevarthen, 1998), which in turn instigates the emergence of 
secondary intersubjectivity, or person-person-object awareness, around 9 months of age 
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978).  Together, the development of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity provides infants and young children with the necessary skills to function in the 





What Infants Gain from Intersubjectivity 
Though intersubjectivity, infants learn to react dynamically to another person’s 
expressions in order to match their distinct pattern and rhythm.  They also orient to and imitate 
how others use and handle objects (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001), which highlights the central role 
of imitation in the infant’s intersubjective development (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; Trevarthen & 
Aitken, 2001).  Early in development, imitation serves to qualify attachments (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1994) and emphasize an infant’s innate motivation for human contact and engagement 
(Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  For older infants and toddlers, imitation is used to demonstrate 
and reinforce relationships (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  Imitation leads older infants and 
toddlers to begin to see people as intentional beings because people can be imitated (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1998).  Thus, through the development of intersubjectivity skills, young children begin to 
attribute emotions, desires, and intentions to the actions people produce (Trevarthen, 1978; 
Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  According to Tager-Flusberg (2005), “understanding people as 
intentional, mental beings is at the core of social cognition” (p. 276).   
Development of the Understanding of Others’ Intentions 
In the first few years of life, young children come to understand others as intentional 
agents who act on the world in similar ways to the child’s actions on the world (Meltzoff, 2007, 
Meltzoff et al., 1999).  Once children begin to see others as intentional, they are able to read 
through the surface behavior of an action to the underlying intention (Johnson, 2005; Meltzoff et 
al., 1999).  Because of the importance of intention reading in the development of more complex 
theory of mind (Meltzoff, 2007), researchers are interested in when children begin to reason 






To investigate when young children begin to understand the intentions of others, Meltzoff 
(1995) developed a research paradigm called the ‘behavioral reenactment’ procedure.  The 
behavioral reenactment procedure is a nonverbal task designed to examine whether children will 
interpret an individual’s behavior literally or if they can read through their behavior and identify 
the intended goal of the individual's actions.  In Meltzoff’s (1995) procedure, an experimenter 
presented the child with five novel objects (e.g. dumbbell, box and stick tool, prong and loop, 
cylinder and beads, square and post) and performed specific actions with the objects.  In the 
target condition, the examiner successfully completed the action with the objects in full (i.e. the 
dumbbell was picked up and held at each end and then pulled outward so that it came apart at the 
mid-point; Meltzoff, 1995).  In the failed intention condition, however, the examiner did not 
successfully accomplish the final goal state with the objects (Meltzoff, 1995).  The experimenter 
tried, but failed, to complete the target action.   
In Meltzoff’s (1995) original study, he reported that typically developing 18-month-old 
children were able to infer the intended actions of others as measured by the behavioral 
reenactment procedure (Meltzoff, 1995).  In this study there were two control conditions, the 
baseline condition and the adult manipulation condition.  In the baseline condition, the objects 
were presented to the children, but the examiner performed no action (Meltzoff, 1995).  This 
condition controlled for the possibility that the objects may afford certain actions and to see if 
children would spontaneously produce the target action.  In the adult manipulation condition, the 
examiner would handle the objects, but the examiner did not perform an action with them 
(Meltzoff, 1995).  This condition was included to control for the possibility that children may be 




Participants in both the target and failed intention conditions performed significantly more target 
actions than subjects in the control conditions (Meltzoff, 1995).  Meltzoff (1995) concluded that 
at 18 months, infants could infer intentionality in others.  The ability to understand intentionality 
suggests that infants have begun to differentiate surface behavior (what an individual does) from 
what an individual is trying to do (Meltzoff, 1995).   
Development of Intentionality.  While Meltzoff (1995) reported the presence of 
intentionality skills at 18 months, subsequent studies have examined whether these skills emerge 
earlier in development.  In a cross-sectional examination of intentionality in typically developing 
infants, Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999) reported evidence of an emerging understanding of 
intentionality as early as 12 months.  Meltzoff’s (1995) study procedures and conditions were 
used in this investigation, with the addition of an endstate condition (i.e. presenting the object to 
the infant as if the target action had been successfully completed).  Bellagamba and Tomasello 
(1999) noted that 12-month-olds would reproduce full target actions when they saw them 
performed by the examiner, but infants would not reproduce target actions when they saw the 
examiner trying and failing to perform an action.  This indicates that 12-month-olds may not 
share the ability of 18-month-olds to understand unsuccessful goal directed actions as intentional 
(Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999).  Nonetheless, this study provides suggestive evidence that the 
understanding of intentionality improves with age (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999).   
This suggested improvement in intentionality as infants’ age is further supported by a 
longitudinal investigation of intentionality from 12-to-15-months (Bellagamba, Camaioni, & 
Colonnesi, 2006). In this study, infants produced more target actions at 15 months than they did 
at 12 months (Bellagamba et al., 2006).  However, 15-month-olds also performed more 




(Bellagamba et al., 2006) that was not observed in 18-month-olds (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 
1999; Meltzoff, 1995).  Taken together, research on intentionality in children under 18 months 
suggests that the ability to interpret an unsuccessful goal directed action as intentional is still 
emerging between 12 and 15 months (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Bellagamba et al., 2006).    
Critiques of Meltzoff’s Paradigm.  Although the research conducted by Bellagamba 
and Tomasello (1999) and Bellagamba and colleagues (2006) has added support to the efficacy 
of Meltzoff’s (1995) paradigm, Huang, Heyes, and Charman (2002; 2005) questioned the 
effectiveness of the behavioral reenactment procedure for measuring intentionality.  The 
criticisms proposed by Huang and colleagues (2002; 2005) are important to consider because 
from these studies it is still unclear if there are other skills influencing the ability of children to 
understand intentionality when using the behavioral reenactment procedure.        
First, Huang and colleagues (2002) posed an important critique of Meltzoff’s paradigm 
about whether children performed the target action because they understand intentionality or if 
they performed the target action because the task leads them to produce the target action through 
expanded imitation.  In order to test whether expanded imitation was the reason children 
performed the target action during the behavioral reenactment procedure, two new conditions: 
emulation learning and stimulus enhancement.  In the emulation learning condition, the examiner 
would show the infant the startstate and endstate of the action, but not the action itself.  In order 
to examine stimulus enhancement, Huang and colleagues (2002) used spatial contingency (e.g. 
the examiner presented the object to the infant with the target relevant pieces close together 
spatial).   
This study found that there were no statistically significant differences in the amount of 




emulation learning condition (Huang et al., 2002).  This challenges previous findings and 
suggests that emulation learning may play a role in children’s performance on the behavioral 
reenactment procedure (Huang et al., 2002).  It is possible that emulation learning occurred 
during the failed intention condition by providing infants with observational information that 
afforded target-relevant information about how to successfully manipulate the objects (Huang et 
al., 2002).  Also, infants in the stimulus enhancement condition produced more target actions 
during the target administration than infants in the other three conditions.  Thus, Huang and 
colleagues (2002) concluded that emulation learning and stimulus enhancement might be factors 
in children’s performances on the behavioral reenactment procedure because these two skills 
lead to the production of target actions (Huang et al., 2002); however, it is unclear from this 
study how they lead to the production of target actions.   
 Next, to further examine the theoretical and methodological foundations of Meltzoff’s 
(1995) behavioral reenactment paradigm, Huang, Heyes, and Charman (2005) investigated the 
role of intention reading, emulation learning, and mimicry in preschool children (31-to-41-
month-olds).  This investigation was driven by the hypothesis that if intention reading is what 
causes children to perform target actions after observing a failed intentional action then older 
children who see the failed intention should produce as many target actions as children who view 
the target action (Huang et al., 2005).  However, if performing the target action depends on both 
intention reading and detection of affordances, then older children should produce more target 
actions when viewing the target action in full than when viewing the failed intention (Huang et 
al, 2005).   
This study adds further support to the suggestive evidence that the understanding of 




Huang et al., 2005).  A similar pattern of performance of target actions that was observed in 19-
months olds emerged for 31-to-41-month-olds, such that children in the target condition 
produced more target actions then children in the other three conditions (i.e. failed intention, 
emulation learning, and adult manipulation condition; Huang et al., 2005).   
Huang and colleagues’ (2002; 2005) findings challenge the previous conclusions that 
children in the failed intention condition produce the target action by inferring the examiners 
intentional action (Bellagamba et al., 2006; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Meltzoff, 1995).   
Huang and colleagues (2005) concluded that in certain situations, infants and preschoolers being 
to understand intentions, but there are social and non-social learning processes affecting how a 
child responds to the observed action.  Specifically, three constructs appear to be active in a 
child’s response: intentional imitation, emulation, and mimicry. Although it is true that these 
skills do appear to be a factor in performance, it is not clear if they are factors in understanding 
intentionality or if they are just factors in understanding cause and effect because the method and 
findings of these studies do not seem to investigate all of these constructs.  It may be more 
accurate to conclude that the findings presented in this study provide suggestive evidence that 
intentional imitation, emulation, and mimicry are active processes in understanding 
intentionality.  More research will be needed to determine how these constructs influence infants 
and young children’s understanding of intentionality.   
Conclusions on Intentionality.  Based on previous research, it is clear there are many 
questions still to be answered about children’s understanding of intentionality.  First, it is still 
unclear whether children are actually inferring others’ intentions or of if they are responding to 
what they observe through emulation learning and affordance detecting during the behavioral 




in more diverse samples (i.e. children from different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, 
and children with developmental disabilities). 
Conclusions  
The research that has been described on intersubjectivity and intentionality in typically 
developing children indicates that primary and secondary intersubjectivity develop over the 
course of the first year (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Meltzoff, 2007 Tager-Flusberg et al., 2006; 
Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) and lead to the development of intentionality around 18 months 
(Bellagmaba & Tomasello, 1999; Bellagamba et al., 2006; Meltzoff, 2007; 1995; Trevarthen, 
1978; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  Understanding the developmental course of intersubjectivity 
in typically developing children provides the foundational knowledge needed to examine 
intentionality in children with WS and DS.  However, to date, intentionality has yet to be 
examined in children with WS and DS.  Therefore, research on intentionality in typically 
developing children can help to guide research on intentionality in children with WS and DS.  In 
the next section, the relevant literature on the behavioral phenotypes and social cognitive abilities 
of individuals with WS and DS is reviewed.  
Neurogenetic Disorders 
 Neurogenetic disorders are the result of genetic abnormalities from either single gene 
mutations (e.g. fragile X syndrome) or from having an entire chromosome or segments of a 
chromosome that are missing (e.g. Williams syndrome) or duplicated (e.g. Down syndrome; 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  The presence of these genetic abnormalities can influence development, 
especially brain development, which has a cascading effect on numerous areas of functioning 
within the individual (Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  The effects of a genetic abnormality can be direct, 




individuals with developmental disabilities of unknown etiology (Dykens, 1995; Hodapp, 2004).  
However, the effects can also be indirect via an evocative genotype-phenotype interaction (Scarr 
& McCartney, 1983), which suggests that characteristics of the individual, such as specific 
etiology-related behaviors, may elicit certain reactions and response from others (Hodapp, 2004; 
Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).  For example, the sociable behaviors and facial expressions of 
children with DS may elicit more positive reactions from others (Hodapp, 2004; Hodapp & 
DesJardin, 2002).  Further, as children with DS continue to receive these responses from their 
social partners they start producing these behaviors with more frequency, leading to the 
development of a sociable and positive personality profile in individuals with DS (Hodapp, 2004; 
Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).  In the last few decades, researchers have started to investigate the 
complex issue of how neurogenetic disorders influence behavior by identifying and examining 
the behavioral phenotypes associated with different neurogenetic disorders (Dykens, 1995; 
Hodapp, 2005; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).   
Behavioral Phenotypes 
Behavioral phenotypes are the measureable behavioral outcomes observed in individuals 
with neurogenetic disorders (Dykens, 1995; O’Brien, 1995).  According to Dykens (1995), a 
behavioral phenotype is conceptualized as “the heightened probability or likelihood that people 
with a given syndrome will exhibit certain behavioral or developmental sequelae relative to those 
without the syndrome” (p. 523).  Therefore, for a specific syndrome, there are behaviors that are 
more probable or “characteristic”, but these behaviors may not emerge for all individuals with 
that syndrome (Dykens, 1995; Hodapp, 2004; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).  In addition, while 
certain behaviors may be associated with a specific syndrome, they may not be completely 




sociability and friendliness in WS and DS; Dlits, Morries, & Leonard, 1990).  Because this 
dissertation focused on the development of intentionality in children with WS and DS, and 
intentionality has yet to be examined in these populations, it is important to consider how the 
behavioral phenotypes associated with these syndromes may influence the ability to understand 
intentionality.  
Williams Syndrome 
Williams syndrome (WS) is one of the most widely researched neurogenetic disorders 
(Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2001) with an incidence rate of 1 in 7500 
(Stromme, Bjornstad, & Ramstad, 2002).  WS is the result of a microdeletion of 16 genes on 
chromosome 7, and in most of these cases (>98%), the same deletion is observable (Mervis & 
Klein-Tasman, 2000).  WS leads to mild to moderate cognitive and developmental impairment 
that is characterized by peaks and valleys in ability and functioning (Bellugi & St. George, 
2001).  Individuals with WS have distinct craniofacial features (Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000), 
giving them a pixie-like or elfin appearance (Bellugi & St. George, 2001; Dykens et al., 2000).  
These craniofacial features include: a broad forehead, high prominent cheekbones, wide mouth, 
full lips, flat nasal bridge, and upturned nose (Dykens, Hodapp, & Finucane, 2000; Kaplan, 
Wang, Franck, 2001).  Many individuals with WS experience physical problems such as a defect 
in the production of elastin, hypercalcemia, hypercusis, heart problems (e.g. arterial stenosis, 
hypertension), and musculoskeletal problems (Bellugi & St. George, 2001; Dykens et al., 2000; 
Kaplan et al., 2001).  In the last few decades, researchers have focused on the examination of the 
specific behavioral phenotype associated with WS in order to identify areas of strength and 
challenge in this population (see Dykens, 2003; Martens, Wilson, & Reytens, 2008; Mervis & 




WS Behavioral Phenotype.  Individuals with WS tend to have relative strengths in 
expressive language, communication, facial production and recognition skills, empathy, 
interpersonal skills, and auditory rote memory (Bellugi & St. George, 2001, Dykens, 2003; 
Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000).  However, individuals with WS also 
tend to experience relative weaknesses in visuospatial construction (i.e. pattern construction), 
motor skills (Bellugi & St. George, 2001; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000), and extreme 
weakness in visual spatial-processing (Bellugi & St. George, 2001; Dykens, 2003).  There is a 
distinct social profile associated with WS, which is characterized by an overly friendly, highly 
sociable (termed hypersociability; Gosch & Pankau, 1997), highly approachable, highly 
gregarious, and people oriented personality style (Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000).  Children and 
adults with WS are eager to interact with others and do not seem to experience stranger anxiety, 
leading them to indiscriminately approach people (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008; Mervis & Klein-
Tasman, 2000).  This combination of strengths, weaknesses, and personality leads to the 
emergence of a unique social cognitive profile, which was the focus of this dissertation.   
Social Cognition Abilities.  Social cognition in children and adults with WS, like other 
domains of development in this population, is characterized by peaks and valleys in performance 
(Bellugi & St. George, 2001).  Most of the research on social cognition in WS has focused on 
describing the distinctive social phenotype associated with WS in order to understand the 
neurocognitive mechanisms behind their social strengths and weakness (Tager-Flusberg & Plesa 
Skwerer, 2007).  The results of this research have demonstrated widespread impairments in 
social cognition starting in infancy and early childhood in WS (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008).  




hypersociability in WS because these abilities are the most relevant to the study of intentionality 
in this population.      
Joint Attention.  A distinct social phenotype emerges during infancy in WS, including 
increased frequency of smiling behavior and an increased frequency of attending to the faces of 
others during infancy (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008).  Infants and toddlers with WS also have a 
strong attraction to people and prefer social stimuli to nonsocial stimuli.  The combination of a 
strong interest in people and atypically intense looking behavior may contribute to difficulties in 
joint attention, which in turn may reduce the opportunity for infants with WS to learn from the 
environment (Laing, et al., 2002, Mervis et al., 2003).  During turn-taking tasks, toddlers with 
WS have higher performance than MA-matched typically developing peers and are more 
interactive during social games, which suggests dyadic interaction strengths in this population 
(Laing et al., 2002).  However during triadic interactions, toddlers with WS display fewer 
instances of initiating joint attention (referential/declarative pointing) and initiation requests 
(instrumental pointing) then MA-matched typically developing peers (Laing et al., 2002).  
During these interactions, children with WS quickly turn what should be a triadic interaction into 
a dyadic interaction, especially when a novel person is present (Doyle, Bellugi, Korenberg, & 
Graham, 2004), which may result from poor joint attention skills (Laing et al. 2002) or it may be 
related to an overall preference for dyadic interaction (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008).  Other 
studies have indicated that responses to joint attention appeared to be developing typically in 
young children with WS, while initiating joint attention skills appear to be delayed (Hepburn, 
Fidler, Hahn, & Philofsky, 2011).  This split in joint attention abilities could disrupt the 
development of intersubjectivity, which in turn would influence later development of theory of 




dyadic interactions even when triadic interactions are necessary may influence future difficulties 
in perspective taking and theory of mind, including the understanding of intentionality.  
Placed within the context of research on intersubjectivity and joint attention in typically 
developing infants, it would appear that children with WS may be missing critical opportunities 
to develop the secondary intersubjectivity skills (i.e. person-person-object awareness) needed to 
develop the understanding of others’ minds.  Also, difficulties in secondary intersubjectivity may 
also lead to difficulties in seeing people as intentional beings (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998) and in 
interpreting the behavior of others in terms of mental states (Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  This 
provides suggestive evidence that children with WS may struggle with the understanding of 
intentionality because as infants and toddlers, they are lacking the foundational intersubjectivity 
skills needed to understand intentionality. Furthermore, if children with WS are struggling with 
these early social cognitive abilities, they may also experience difficulties in more complex 
social cognitive skills, such as theory of mind  (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Meltzoff, 2007 Tager-
Flusberg et al., 2006; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).    
Theory of Mind.  Early in the pursuit of research on theory of mind in WS, researchers 
believed there was relative sparing of theory of mind because most individuals with WS would 
pass first order and higher order false belief tasks (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & 
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1998).  However, more recent research has 
called into question the notion of relative sparing in theory of mind.  For example, studies 
examining first order false belief in children with WS have uncovered that children with WS 
perform no better on these tasks than matched comparison groups (i.e. children with Prader-Willi 
syndrome and children with idiopathic developmental disabilities; Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & 




there appears to be no difference in the ability of individuals with WS to distinguish lies from 
jokes (Sullivan, Winner, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003) or in their ability to use trait information to 
attribute intentionality (Plesa Skwerer & Tager-Flusberg, 2006), which are important precursors 
to understanding theory of mind. 
In fact it seems that individuals with WS actually have difficulty with higher-order false 
belief tasks (Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen, 1998; Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg, 1999).  
Similarly, studies on mentalizing abilities (i.e. quickly attributing someone’s mental state based 
on their facial and vocal expressions) in children, adolescents, and adults with Williams 
syndrome suggests that there is no evidence for the relative sparing of these abilities (Plesa 
Skwerer, Verbalis, Schofield, Faja, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  In one study, adults with WS performed worse on attributing mental 
states to others than their typically developing peers, but also performed better than 
developmentally matched adults with Prader-Willi syndrome (Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998).  This 
study provided some of the preliminary evidence that there may not be relative sparing in theory 
of mind.  Furthermore, this study suggests that instead of relative sparing there may be selective 
sparing in some of the social cognition skills required to attribute mental states (Tager-Flusberg 
et al., 1998). These studies suggest that individuals with WS have problems “making inferences 
to narratives to interpret mental state information” (Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2007, p. 
98).   
Difficulty understanding and interpreting mental state information may be observed in 
individuals with WS because such information is usually inferred by interpreting social cues 
from faces, voices, and bodily movements, a combination of preserved and impaired abilities in 




2010; Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2007; Tager-Flusberg, Plesa Skwerer, Faja, & Joseph, 
2003; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006; Udwin & Yule, 1991).  Also, the 
perception that individuals with WS can tune into mental states may be more related to the 
emotions presented during the interaction than an actual understanding of the mental state behind 
those emotions (Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Gosch & Pankau, 1997; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002; 
Jones et al., 2000; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006).  Individuals with WS may have difficulties 
interpreting mental states because they lack the social knowledge that is normally acquired 
through theory of mind (Davies, Udwin, & Howlin, 1998; Dykens & Rosner, 1999).  A gap in 
understanding may lead individuals with WS to have impaired social judgment and difficulties in 
perspective taking, applying emotional information, making and maintain friendships, and other 
important social cognitive abilities (Davies et al., 1998; Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Jarvinen-Pasley 
et al., 2008; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).   
Based on these studies and research on the social profile associated with WS, Tager-
Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) proposed a componential view of theory of mind, delineating two 
processes that underlie the development of theory of mind: social-perceptual skills and social-
cognitive skills (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  Social-perceptual skills are closely related to 
the affective system and involve making judgments based on the perceptual and social 
information available during a social interaction (Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000).  Social-cognitive skills build on social-perceptual skills and involve the higher 
order thinking abilities that make up the traditional conceptualization of theory of mind (Tager-
Flusberg, 2005; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  Together these skills allow for cognitive 
inferences to be made about the content of mental states by applying information from past 




Using this model, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s (2000) research on theory of mind in 
WS indicates that there is relative sparing of social-perceptual abilities in this population, while 
social-cognitive abilities are relatively weaker.  Because existing research in this area has 
focused on older children with WS, it is unclear if a dissociation in social-perceptual and social-
cognitive abilities emerges in infancy and early childhood.  However, research on young children 
with WS provides suggestive evidence that this dissociation does begin in early childhood 
(Fidler et al., 2007; Laing et al., 2002).  In order to explore the emergence of this dissociation, 
Hepburn, Fidler, Hahn, and Philofsky (2011) examined the social-perpetual and social-cognitive 
behaviors of young children with WS (under the age of 5), autism, and typically developing 
children.  Results indicated that young children with WS demonstrated intact social-perceptual 
skills and emerging deficits in social-cognitive skills (Hepburn et al., 2011).  What is still unclear 
from this study is whether there is a dissociation in social-perpetual and social-cognitive skills in 
young children with WS understanding of early mental states, like desires and intentions.  Due to 
the affective nature of social-perceptual abilities it is important to consider how hypersociability 
in WS may influence the understanding of intentionality in WS.  
Hypersociability.  The combination of relative strengths in interpersonal skills and the 
distinct social profile associated with WS drives individuals with WS to socially engage with 
others (Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002; Jones et al., 2000; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000).  As 
previously mentioned, a strong interest in people emerges during infancy (Tager-Flusberg et al., 
2006), with infants with WS attending to the faces of others with more frequency and smiling 
more (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008).  Infants and toddlers with WS spend more time looking at 
their mother and at strangers then infants and toddlers of the same chronological or 




more intensely at strangers in a manner that is not observed in typically developing children 
(Mervis et al., 2003).  Children with WS are described as good social partners who are very 
friendly, highly empathic, and able to tune into other people’s mental states because they seem to 
have special sensitivity to the emotional states of others (Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Gosch & 
Pankau, 1997; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002; Jones et al., 2000; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006).   
 Given their high levels of empathy, emotional responsivity, and attunement to others, it 
would be plausible to speculate that children with WS might show relative sparing or even 
strength in perspective taking.  However, there is evidence that young children with WS do not 
use knowledge of their social partners’ emotions to guide their behavior (Fidler et al., 2007).  
Thus, even if children with WS imitate their social partners’ affect, for example dislike towards a 
type of food, they may still earnestly offer their social partner the disliked item (Fidler et al., 
2007).  This suggests that children with WS may have difficulties applying emotional 
information and taking the perspectives of others, which is a critical skill for understanding the 
mental states of others (Trevarthen, 1978; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).   
Present Study.  The first study in this dissertation was designed to test Tager-Flusberg 
and Sullivan (2000)’s hypothesis that there is a dissociation between social-perceptual abilities 
and social-cognitive abilities in children with WS.  In order to understand the intentions of 
others, both social-perceptual and social-cognitive skills are needed.  To examine the possible 
presence of a dissociation between these two domains, Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral reenactment 
procedure was administered with and without experimenter affective cues (e.g. facial, vocal, and 
gestural cues).  Based on past research on theory of mind (Hepburn et al., 2011; Plesa Skwerer et 
al., 2006; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) and emotion 




DesJardin, 2002; Jones et al., 2000; Laing et al., 2002; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006), it is possible 
that the presence of emotional cues will serve as a further distraction in understanding the 
intentions of others leading children with WS to be more likely to misinterpret the social-
cognitive information they observe and instead focus on sharing in the emotional experience 
with their social partner.       
Down Syndrome 
Down syndrome (DS) is the most identifiable and common chromosomal abnormality 
associated with intellectual disability, with an incidence rate of 1 in every 732 (Canfield et al., 
2006).  DS is caused by the presence of three copies of the 21
st
 chromosome, resulting in three 
distinct genotypes: trisomy 21, mosaicism, and translocation.  Individuals with DS also have 
distinct craniofacial features, which include an upward and outward slant to the eyes, wide nasal 
bridge, and brachycephaly (Dennis, 1995).  Other physical characteristics include small stature, 
low muscle tone, short neck, hypotonia in infancy, and joint laxity (Dennis, 1995).  About one-
third of individuals with DS are born with heart defects (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; Dennis, 
1995).  Individuals with DS are also at an increased risk for other medical conditions such as 
respiratory and hearing problems, childhood leukemia, Alzheimer’s disease, and thyroid 
conditions (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; Dennis, 1995).  In addition to the investigation of 
physical characteristic and heath conditions associated with DS, researchers have also focused on 
identifying the specific behavioral phenotype associated with DS in order to identify areas of 
behavioral strength and challenge in individuals with DS (see Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; Fidler, 
2005; 2006 for a review).   
DS Behavioral Phenotype.  Individuals with DS tend to show relative strengths in 




prosocial responses; Kasari, Freeman, & Bass, 2003), receptive language, nonverbal social 
communication, primary intersubjectivity, reciprocal turn taking, and other social initiations 
(Fidler, 2005; 2006; 2008; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).  It has been noted that young children 
with DS show strengths in social relatedness (Fidler, 2005; Kasari et al., 1990; Ruskin et al., 
1994), and have a preference for people over objects.  However, during cognitively challenging 
tasks children with DS may overuse their social relatedness skills to compensate for weaknesses 
in other domains (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Fidler, 2006).  Individuals with DS also experience 
relative weaknesses in verbal processing, expressive language, instrumental communication, 
verbal short-term memory, emotion recognition, and some areas of motor development 
(Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; Fidler, 2005; 2006; Wishart, 2007).  Also, researchers note a 
particular motivation profile such that individuals with DS engage in lower levels of task 
persistence and higher levels of off task behavior (Fidler, 2005).  The domain of the DS 
behavioral phenotype that is most relevant to the development of intentionality in children with 
DS is the development of social cognition in this population.  
Social Cognition.  Social cognition in DS has not received as much research attention 
when compared to other areas of the DS behavioral phenotype, because historically it was 
thought that this domain was spared (Cebula & Wishart, 2008).  Because individuals with DS are 
characterized as having intact social skills (Fidler, Most, Booth-LaForce, & Kelly, 2008; 
Gilmore, Campbell, & Cuskelly, 2003), it has been assumed that social understanding is also 
relatively intact (Cebula, Moore, & Wishart, 2010; Wishart, 2007).  However, more recent 
research into the social cognitive profile associated with DS suggests that social cognition does 
not seem to be “playing the same supporting role” (p.45) in the overall development of children 




actually be compromised in this population (Wishart, 2007).  Although the developmental 
sequence of social cognitive skills in DS follows a similar pattern to that observed in typically 
developing infants and children (Cebula et al., 2010; Cebula & Wishart, 2008), these skills are 
qualitatively different and take longer to develop in infants with DS, which may influence the 
development of more complex social cognitive skills in later development (Cebula & Wishart, 
2008).  This differentiation in the developmental of social cognition can be observed in the 
development of intersubjectivity in DS. 
Intersubjectivity.  Infants with DS achieve the developmental milestones associated with 
primary intersubjectivity (i.e. mutual gaze, joint attention, etc.; Fidler, 2006), but with noticeable 
differences from the typical trajectory.  Mutual gaze in infants with DS is slow to emerge, but 
then it persists at a high level into the middle of the 1
st
 year at a time when typical infants begin 
to shift their focus from people to the world around them (Cebula et al., 2010; Cebula & Wishart, 
2008; Berger & Cunningham, 1981; Carvajal & Iglesias, 2000).  By the middle of their first year, 
infants with DS show increased looking behavior (Crown, Feldstein, Jasnow, & Beebe, 1992; 
Gunn, Berry, & Andrews, 1982).  This longer looking time may come at the expense of the 
development of other social cognition skills, such as dividing and switching attention, leading to 
difficulties in the development of joint attention (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Legerstee & 
Weintraub, 1997).  Once joint attention skills develop, infants with DS are more likely to be a 
passive participant, sharing attention to objects, rather than actively participating in the 
coordination of attention by pointing to objects (Legerstee & Weintraub, 1997).  This suggests 
that the coordination of attention between people and objects progresses more slowly in infants 
with DS, leading to fewer instances of joint attention (Legerstee & Weintraub, 1997).  




joint attention (Mundy, Sigman, Kasari, & Yirmiya, 1988; & Sigman & Ruskin, 1999) and levels 
of coordinated joint attention that is similar to MA-matched typically developing children 
(Kasari et al., 1995).   
Generally, toddlers with DS appear to use pointing gestures competently and more 
frequently than typically developing children (Cebula et al., 2010, Cebula & Wishart, 2008), 
(Franco & Wishart, 1995).  Because of expressive language delays, this may be an effective form 
of nonverbal communication for toddlers with DS (Cebula & Wishart, 2008).  Even though 
toddlers with DS have strengths in pointing gestures, they also use fewer spontaneous requesting 
gestures than MA-matched peers (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Fidler et al., 2005; Franco & 
Wishart, 1995; Mundy et al., 1988).  However, the difficulties children with DS experience in 
nonverbal requesting are less pronounced during social games (e.g. tickle game) than they are in 
other games and interaction with toys (Fidler et al., 2005).  Furthermore, children with DS have 
been found to be less engaged in situations created to promote requesting and commenting than 
they were in situations created to promote simple interaction suggesting language based joint 
attention may be a problem (Adamson et al., 2009).  These strengths and weakness in nonverbal 
communication could influence the ability of children with DS to understand intentionality.   
Conclusions on Intersubjectivity.  Taken together, Cebula and Wishart (2010) conclude 
that developing intersubjectivity skills (i.e. joint attention, non-verbal requesting, imitation, and 
social referencing) support the ongoing development of person-person-object awareness, which 
in turn influences the theory of mind abilities in DS.  The deficits related to theory of mind in DS 
are more subtle than in other syndromes with theory of mind deficits, like autism, which is why 




Binne & Williams, 2002; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman, & Pilowsky, 1996; Zelazo et al., 
1996). 
Theory of Mind.  Early research on theory of mind in children with DS suggested that 
first and second order false belief abilities are intact when matched to typically developing 
children on receptive language ability (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  
However, Cebula and Wishart (2008) propose that these findings may be result of using 
receptive language ability instead of a measure of mental age when examining theory of mind 
because other studies on theory of mind in children and adults with DS have not replicated these 
results.  
In one study of theory of mind in individuals with DS, autism, developmental disabilities, 
and typically developing children, results indicated that individuals with DS had similar 
performance to typically developing children on the value task (e.g. asking the child whether the 
examiner liked or disliked a food item after the experimenter displayed facial like or dislike for 
the food; Yirmiya et al., 1996). However, typically developing children performed better than 
children with DS on the fact task (e.g. having knowledge that a candy box was full while the 
experimenter did not know whether or not the box was full).  This suggests that individuals with 
DS are more successful at easier theory of mind tasks.  When compared to receptive language 
matched typically developing children, individuals with DS also appear to have difficulties with 
standard theory of mind tasks, failing 9 of 12 theory of mind tasks (Zelazo et al., 1996).    
All of these studies have used more complex theory of mind tasks.  To date there has 
been no research on early aspects of theory of mind, like desires and intentions.  In order to fully 
conceptualize theory of mind abilities and social cognitive abilities in children with DS, it is 




mind abilities in DS are influenced by the individual’s executive function abilities, specifically 
rule use (Zelazo et al., 1996).  This study found that the ability to understand theory of mind and 
the ability to understand rule use are related to one another, such that if individuals with DS 
failed one task they were more likely to fail the other task.  Also, this understanding did not 
appear to be related to mental age; therefore, there is some other process that may be influencing 
understanding of these skills.  However, this study does not take into account how other aspects 
of executive functioning, such as working memory, inhibition, and planning, may play a role in 
theory of mind abilities of individuals with DS.  
Executive Function.  Research on executive function in DS is limited and there is even 
less research on children with DS under the age of 10 (Lee, Fidler, Blakeley-Smith, Daunhauer, 
Robinson, & Hepburn, 2011).  The EF domain that has received the greatest amount of research 
attention is working memory, which has been characterized as an area of weakness including 
pronounced weaknesses reported in the domain of verbal working memory (Jarrold & Braddeley, 
2001; Kogan et al., 2009; Lanfranchi, Cornoldi, & Vianello, 2004; Lanfranchi, Jerman, Dal Pont, 
Alberti, & Vianelo, 2010; Lanfranchi, Jerman, & Vianello, 2009; Vicari, Carlesimo, & 
Caltagirone, 1995).  This pattern of working memory deficits has also been observed in caregiver 
report of executive function in early childhood (Lee et al., 2011).   Similarly, research on 
inhibition indicates that children, adolescents, and adults with DS displayed weaker performance 
than chronological and MA-matched comparison groups (Kopp, Krakow, & Johnson, 1983; 
Lanfranchi et al., 2010; Rowe, Lavender, & Turk, 2006).  However, in early childhood inhibition 
has not been found to be an area of weakness (Lee et al., 2011).   
During laboratory planning tasks, individuals with DS tend to have less efficient problem 




2001; Fidler, Hepburn, Mankin, & Rogers, 2005; Lanfranchi et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2006).  In 
addition, these deficits have been identified in caregiver reports of planning abilities (Lee et al., 
2011).  Individuals with DS performed worse on shifting tasks, especially when they had to sort 
by more than one rule (i.e. short by shape and color) or had to switch rules mid-task (i.e. short by 
color, now sort by shape; Lanfranchi et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2006; Zelazo et al., 1996).  
Problems with shifting have been observed during social referencing situations, where children 
with DS have been shown to exhibit less shifting of attention between their social partner and the 
indented stimulus (Kasari et al., 1995).   
Taken together, these studies provide suggestive evidence for deficits in all domains of 
executive function.  These skills may influence the ability of children with DS to understand 
intentionality.  First, in order to complete a successful target action, the child will have to plan 
how to correctly complete the action based on the intentional information they are presented with 
and inhibit any inclination to imitate the failed intention.  Also, if children with DS experience 
difficulties with shifting in general, (Lanfranchi et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2006; Zelazo et al., 
1996) and in social referencing situations (Kasari et al., 1995), it is possible children with DS 
will have difficulties with intentionality.  This may be especially true when using the behavioral 
reenactment procedure because during the task, the child is using social referencing to interpret 
what the examiner is trying to do.  Finally, this whole process of interpreting the intentional 
action and performing the target action may depend on the child’s working memory abilities 
because the child will need to hold and apply the relevant pieces of information they have 
observed in order to successfully perform the target action.    
Present Study. Based on past research on intersubjectivity and theory of mind in DS, it 




similar to MA-matched peers with DD.  In the second study of this dissertation, task 
performance on Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral reenactment procedure of children with DS was 
compared to children with DD.  Using the behavioral reenactment procedure may also account 
for past criticisms of theory of mind tasks being too language intensive and, therefore, the reason 
children with DS do not perform well (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Zelazo et al., 1996).  However, 
the behavioral reenactment procedure has not been used to examine intentionality in children 
over 4 years of age.  Therefore, it is possible that this task may not be developmentally 
appropriate for older children.  Nonetheless, there is currently no measure of intentionality for 
older children.  Finally, it is possible that the understanding of intentionality is also influenced by 
other social cognitive skills during early childhood (i.e. joint attention and affect sharing; Cebula 
& Wishart, 2010) and executive function skills in middle childhood (Kasari et al., 1995; Zelazo 





CHAPTER 3 – GENERAL METHOD 
Research Design and Rationale 
A quantitative research methods approach was implemented because the outcome 
variable in the present dissertation was performance on the intentionality task, which was 
measured by the proportion of actions completed during the task.  A quantitative approach was 
also supported by previous research on intentionality when using Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral 
reenactment procedure (Bellagamba, & Tomasello, 1999, Bellagamba et al., 2006; Huang et al., 
2002; 2005; Meltzoff, 1995).  Specifically, a comparative research approach was used because 
participants were not randomly assigned to groups, which means that cause and effect 
conclusions could not be drawn (Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2009).  The general design 
classification was a between-group comparison (i.e. each participant is in only one condition).  
Study 1 compared the performance of children with WS who received affective cues to children 
with WS who did not receive affective cues.  In addition, study 1 compared performance of 
children with WS who did not receive affective cues to MA-matched children with DD.  For 
Study 2, we compared the performance of young children with DS to older children with DS.  In 
addition, the performance of young children with DS was compared to the performance of MA-
matched children with DD.   
There was also an associational component to the present dissertation.  Study 1 explored 
the relationship between performance on the intentionality task and the child’s chronological age 
(CA), verbal mental age (VMA), and nonverbal mental age (NVMA).  For Study 2, the 
relationship between performance on the intentionality task and joint attention and affect sharing 
was examined in young children with DS.  Study 2 also examined the relationship between 




Finally, the relationship between performance on the intentionality task and the child’s CA, 
VMA, and NVMA was explored.   
Validity 
With regard to internal validity, there are some issues with this dissertation that need to 
be addressed.  Both Study 1 and Study 2 compared the performance of children with WS and DS 
to children with developmental disabilities, which means that there are uncontrolled 
characteristics of the individuals that may threaten the internal validity of the study (Gliner et al., 
2009).  However, participants were matched as closely as possible on nonverbal mental age and 
verbal mental age when possible.  Another aspect of internal validity that could be a potential 
problem was that some participants were tested in a lab and others were tested at their homes or 
at conferences.  This method was necessary to achieve a sample of this size from these 
populations, but this could contribute to differences in performance.  
With regards to external validity, convenience sampling and snowball sampling methods 
were used to obtain this sample, which could affect the generalizablilty of the findings (Gliner et 
al., 2009).  As mentioned before, data from participants were collected in different locations.  
Therefore, it was not possible to control for other external factors like the time of day or the 
conditions of the room.  This could affect whether these results can be generalized to real-life 
outcomes (Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2009).  However, all of the tasks (i.e. intentionality task 
and the Early Social Communication Scales) were designed to instigate assessment within the 
context of playful activities.  Using this approach could help the tasks, and the responses, to be 
less artificial because the child feels as though they are just playing with toys.  Finally, all the 




been standardized and normed on typical and atypical populations with acceptable validity and 





CHAPTER 4 - STUDY 1 METHOD 
Participants 
Participants for Study 1 were 25 children with a confirmed diagnosis of WS.  Within in 
the WS group, half of the participants received affective cues (i.e. facial, vocal, and gestural 
cues) during administration of the intentionality task and the other half did not.  Children with 
WS who received affective cues (N = 13) had a mean CA of 46.31 months, a mean VMA of 
28.20 months, and a mean NVMA of 22.59 months (See Table 4.1 for developmental and 
demographic information).  Children with WS who did not receive affective cues (N = 12) had a 
mean CA of 44.55 months, a mean VMA of 32.77 months, and a mean NVMA of 26.77 months.  
Independent Samples t-tests were performed to examine differences between the children with 
WS who received affective cues and children with WS who did not receive affective cues on CA, 
MA, and NVMA.  There were no statistically significant differences observed between the two 
groups on any of these dimensions.   
Table 4.1 
 














Characteristic M/% SD M/% SD M/% SD 
Child       
CA (in months) 46.31 17.56 44.55 11.71 39.91 12.10 
Verbal MA (in months) 28.20 7.99 32.77 7.97 29.32 7.23 
Nonverbal MA (in months) 22.59 5.74 26.77 6.57 29.60 8.13 
       
Child gender (% male) 38.5  38.5  33.3  
Child Ethnicity (%)       
Caucasian 84.6  100  58.4  
Hispanic 7.7  -  8.3  
More than 1 race 7.7  -  8.3  






In addition, the performances of the 12 children with WS who did not receive affective 
cues during the intentionality administration were compared to those of 12 children with 
developmental disabilities (DD; idiopathic DD = 3, questionable/unknown etiology = 2, speech 
language delay = 1, DD with sensory integration disorder = 1, Smith-Magenis syndrome = 1, 
velocardiofacial syndrome = 1, Sturge-Webber with Psychosis = 1, Cochayne syndrome = 1, 
Chromosome 18 = 1).  Participants in these two groups were matched on CA, VMA, and NVMA 
(see Table 4.1).  Children with DD had a mean CA of 39.91 months, a mean VMA of 29.32 
months, and a mean NVMA of 29.60.  Group differences were examined using Independent 
Samples t-tests.  No statistically significant differences were observed between the two groups 
on the matching variables (i.e. CA, VMA, and NVMA).  
Participants for both the WS and DD groups were recruited through the Autism and 
Developmental Disability Research Groups at the University of Colorado Medical School, JFK 
Partners Center for Excellence in Developmental Disabilities, parent support groups (Williams 
Syndrome Association; Mile High Down Syndrome Association; Rocky Mountain Chapter of 
the Williams Syndrome Association), and local agencies.   
Data Collection 
Before consent was obtained, consent forms were reviewed with each family and all 
parent questions regarding the study were answered.  All of the examiners for these studies were 
Master’s or doctoral level researchers who had several years of experience working with children 
with developmental disabilities.  During administration of the test battery, two examiners were 




counter-balanced and administered in at least two visits in order to reduce fatigue and maintain 
participant engagement and attention.     
Matching.  According to Chapman and Hesketh (2000), mental age matching (MA-
matching) is a way to account for developmental level or what one has learned, and thus is a 
better dimension for matching than chronological age.  MA-matching has been used in numerous 
other studies involving children with developmental disabilities (e.g. Fidler et al., 2005; 2007; 
2008; Kasari et al., 1995; 2001; Kasari & Freeman, 2001; Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003; Mervis 
et al., 2003; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Zelazo et al., 1996).  
In the present study, children with WS who received affective cues were matched to children 
with WS who did not receive affective cues on non-verbal mental age (NVMA), verbal mental 
age (VMA), and chronological age (CA).  Also, children with WS who did not receive affective 
cues were matched to children with DD on CA, VMA, and NVMA.        
Group Differences.  Independent samples t-tests were performed to compare 
performance of children with WS who received affective cues and children with WS who did not 
receive affective cues on the matching variables (i.e. CA, VMA, and NVMA).  The results of the 
independent samples t-tests indicated that there were no statistically significant differences 
between the two WS groups.  Similarly, independent samples t-tests were performed to compare 
the performance of the children with WS who did not receive affective cues to children with DD 
on the matching variables.  The independent samples t-tests results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant differences between children with WS and children with DD.  The non-
significant results of these analyses enable the researchers to make comparisons between the two 







Child information sheet.  Parents were asked to provide information about their age, 
education level, income, and the child’s ethnicity.   
Mullen Scales of Early Learning (Mullen, 1995).  The Mullen Scales of Early Learning 
(MSEL) is a standardized, observational test for children ages 3 to 60 months assessing cognitive 
abilities and motor skills.  All of the items on the MSEL are performance-based and are designed 
to pose a challenge only in the skill being assessed. Scoring is based on T scores (M = 50) and 
age equivalent scores.  Strong concurrent validly with other well-known developmental tests 
(e.g. Bayley Scales of Infant Development, Peabody Developmental Motor Scales, Birth to 
Three Scale) has been established.  Also, content validity, construct validity, and predictive 
validity has been established for this measure (Mullen, 1995).  Internal consistency coefficients 
range from .83 to .95, test-retest reliability coefficients ranged from .82 to .85, and interrater 
reliability coefficients range from .91 to .99.  
Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised (Roid & Miller, 1995, 1997). The 
Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised (Leiter-R) is a standardized measure of 
nonverbal intelligence.  In the present study, the Leiter-R Brief IQ Composite was used to 
measure nonverbal intelligence.  The Brief IQ is constructed from the four subtests: Figure 
Ground, Form Completion, Sequential Order, and Repeated Patterns.  The Leiter-R has been 
standardized on a national sample of almost 2,000 individuals from 2.0 to 20.11 years old and 
has established evidence for fairness across different ethnic and socioeconomic groups (Roid & 
Miller, 2002). The Leiter-R Brief IQ Composite demonstrated adequate concurrent validity 
correlating with the WISC-III Full Scale and Performance IQs (.85) and high test-retest 




Intentionality Task.  This task was adapted from Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral 
reenactment procedure.  The purpose of this task is to assess a child’s understanding of the 
intentions of others.  Specifically, this task examined if children understand the intended action 
that an examiner is trying to complete.  In the present study, nine sets of intentionality toys were 
used: prong and two (2) loops; cylinder, stick and beads; Plastic square with hole, post and ball; 
two (2) small plastic nesting cups; dumbbell; two (2) wooden blocks with holes, rope; two (2) 
nets and toy grasshopper; Winnie the Pooh doll and chair; lily pad, frog/fish and cotton ball.  The 
order of presentation of the toys was randomized.  All toys were kept hidden before they were 
brought to the table for demonstration. The toys were then returned to a container before the next 
toy was presented.  There were six trials for this task: three administrations of the target 
condition and three administrations of the failed intention condition.  These administrations were 
also randomized.  For 27% of the administrations, there were only 2 administrations of the target 
action because of problems with the toys.  In the target condition, the experimenter modeled the 
entire target action with the toy successfully.  In the failed intention condition, the experimenter 
tried to do the target action, but was unsuccessful.   
Before each of the trials, the child was presented with each toy for that trial for at least a 
20-second baseline period, or until the child had a chance to explore the toy. This initial baseline 
period established that they would not spontaneously make the target actions with the toys on 
their own without the experimental model.  In the event that the child spontaneously produced 
the action, the examiner performed a different target action. After this period, the examiner 
would take back the toy, saying, “Can I have a turn?”.  The experimenter then modeled the 
appropriate experimental condition with the toy, either the target condition or the failed intention 




was given the toy for a 20-second response period.  Timing started from when the child touched 
the object.  If, during the baseline period, the child demonstrated the target behavior, then an 
alternate behavior was presented. 
Emotional displays by experimenter.  To investigate how the presence of affective cues 
influenced performance on the intentionality task in WS, in half of the administrations the 
examiner did not show emotional displays (no facial, vocal or gestural displays) during the 
intentionality trials.  For the target action administration the examiner showed facial displays of 
joy (wide smile) or surprise (eyes wide, slight smile), they said “ta da” or “yea”, and they 
clapped or showed surprise with their hands (hands out palms up).  Also, for the action with the 
dumbbell, they made a motor noise while putting the pieces together.  For the failed intention 
administration, the examiner showed signs of concentration or trying (furrowed brow, bite lip, 
frown), they said “shoot” or “ugh”, and for gestural display they would hang their head or 
slammed this fist/hand down.   
Coding.  Two coders (undergraduate research assistants) who were naïve to the 
hypotheses in this study coded the data (see Appendix 1 for coding scheme).  Cohen’s kappa was 
calculated for 20% of the videos to establish interrater reliability (kappa = .81).  The coders met 
with the Co-PI to reconcile any discrepancies or difficult administrations.  The PI was asked for 
help in reconciliation if the discrepancies could not be solved between them.  For each trial, they 
coded the action of the examiner and the action of the child.  As per Bellagamba and colleagues 
(2006) and Huang and colleagues (2002; 2005), when the examiner performed the target action, 
there were three responses coded for the child (target action, no action, other action) and four 
responses coded for the child when the examiner performs the failed intention condition (target 




A target action was coded if the child successfully performed the target action as the 
examiner did or as the examiner intended to do on the failed intention administration (e.g. 
successfully putting the beads into the cup).  For some children performing the target action was 
difficult because they were not strong enough or had poor motor skills.  Therefore, trying was 
defined as actively trying to complete the action, such that the child would have completed the 
task if they were stronger or had better motor skills.  An imitation of the failed intention was 
coded when the child imitated the examiner’s failure (e.g. missing the cup and letting the beads 
slide down the side of the cup).  For coding purposes, an “other action” was defined as any 
action the child produced with the toys other than the target or imitation of the failed intention.  
Similarly, a code of “no action” meant that the child did not perform any actions with the toys 
(i.e. the child either did not touch the toys or just held them in their hands).   
In addition, the first action performed by the children was coded, as well as all of the 
subsequent actions performed during the 20-second response time, as per Huang and colleagues 
(2002; 2005).  By coding the first action and all the subsequent actions, it was possible to 
examine whether children used a trial and error process, or whether certain actions that preceded 
the completion of the target action (Huang et al., 2002; 2005).  For each trial the coders also 
indicated whether or not the target action and imitation of the failed intention was ever 
performed during the trial.  This allowed for an overall summary of performance on each trial.  
For affective displays, the facial, vocal, and gestural displays of the children were coded.  
The facial displays that were coded were concentration/trying (frows brow, eyes drawn down), 
surprise (eyes wide, eye brows up, mouth open, maybe smile), happy/joy (smile), frown (corner 
of the lips turned downward), and pursing or biting lips.  For vocalizations, coding focused on 




turn?”, “ta da”, “yay”, “ugh”, “shoot” and the motor sound).  The gestural display codes were, 
clap, hands out and open (surprise), hanging their head, and clenching their fist.  Also, for all of 
the affective displays there was the code of “other”.  This code was used for any facial, vocal, or 
gestural displays the child produced.  Whenever  “other” was coded, the coders would also 
indicate what this other behavior was (e.g. facial displays of anger, saying “let me show you”, 
etc.).      
Data Analysis 
Following Huang and colleagues (2002; 2005) the proportion of target action, imitations 
of the intention, and other actions for the target and intention administrations were created.  For 
example, if the child produced the target action on the three target administrations then they had 
a proportion of 1.  Using this method allows for the use of data from participants who only 
received five administrations.   
To investigate whether there was a dissociation between social-perceptual and social-
cognitive abilities in children with WS who did and did not receive affective cues, relative 
likelihood statistics and the confidence intervals associated with those statistics were used.  
Relative likelihood ratios were used because these statistics may be more informative than the 
magnitude of the difference in the number of actions performed between the two groups of 
children with WS.  Likelihood ratios are especially informative when the proportions are close to 
zero (Agresti & Finlay, 2009), which was the case in this study.  Also, use of this statistic allows 
for an easy interpretation of the relative differences between the two groups because a relative 
likelihood statistic of 3, for example, means that one group was three times as likely to 
performed an action than the other group (Fidler et al., 2007). Relative likelihood statistics and 




performance on the intentionality task between children with WS and children with DD.  The 
relationship between developmental status and performance on the intentionality task was 
examined using Spearman rho correlations because the proportion created for performance was 






CHAPTER 5 – STUDY 1 RESULTS 
Research Question 1 – Dissociation between Social-Perceptual and Social-Cognitive Skills  
It was hypothesized that children with WS who received affective cues would perform 
more target actions on the target administration than children with WS who did not receive 
affective cues.  Indeed, 100% of children with WS who received affective cues performed the 
target action on the target administration, while 66.7% of children with WS who did not receive 
affective cues performed the target action on the target administration (see Table 5.1).  This 
suggests that when observing the target action performed correctly, the presence of affective cues 
does improve performance (relative likelihood = 1.5, 95% CI = 1.01-2.24).  It was further 
hypothesized that children with WS who received affective cues would imitate the failed 
intention more on the failed intention administration than children with WS who did not receive 
affective cues.  Of children with WS who received affective cues, 76.9% imitated the failed 
intention, while 41.7% of children with WS who did not receive affective cues imitated the failed 
intention (relative likelihood = 1.85, 95% CI = .89 to 3.84).  This suggests that children with WS 
who received affective cues were 85% more likely to imitate the failed intention as children with 
WS who did not receive affective cues.  Finally, it was hypothesized that children with WS who 
did not receive affective cues would perform more target actions on the failed intention 
administration than children with WS who received affective cues.  However, children with WS 


















Group N % 
Affective Cues   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 13 100 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
9 69.2 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention  10 76.9 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  13 100% 
Proportion of Other Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration  
13 100 
   
No Affective Cues   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 8 66.7 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
9 75 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention  5 41.7 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  12 100 




As previously discussed, children with WS have demonstrated heightened levels of 
emotional responsivity during interactions with a social partner (Fidler et al., 2007).  In the 
present investigation, we hypothesized that there would be an increased likelihood of affective 
responses for children with WS who received affective cues when compared to children with WS 
who did not receive affective cues.  There were three forms of affect examined in the present 
study: facial, vocal, and gestural displays.  Although both groups produced some form of affect 
on almost every administration regardless of whether it was the target or failed intention 
administration, children with WS who received affective cues produced more affective responses 
than children with WS who did not receive affective cues (Affect M = 17.08, SD = 5.45; No 




displays by the social partner led children with WS to produce more affect than when the social 
partner did not produce any affect.  There was also some variation in the types of affect between 
groups.  Most interestingly, 53.8% of children with WS who received affective cues performed 
gestural displays, while none of the children in the no affect group produced gestural displays of 
any kind.  Children with WS who received affective cues were more likely to produce facial 
displays than children with WS who did not receive affective cues (Affect M = 11.77, SD = 3.35; 
No Affect M = 9.33, SD = 3.42).  Also, children with WS who did not receive affective cues also 
performed slightly more vocal displays than children with WS who received affective cues (No 
Affect M = 5.33, SD = 2.87; Affect M = 4.77, SD = 3.65).   
Table 5.2 
 










Type of Affect M SD M SD 
Facial 11.77 3.35 9.33 3.42 
Vocal 4.77 3.65 5.33 2.87 
Gestural .54 .52 0 0 
  
Children with WS who did not receive affective cues were also compared to an MA-
matched group of children with DD in order to gain insight into whether there is a different 
pattern of task performance for children with WS.  It was hypothesized that children with WS 
who did not receive affective cues would imitate the failed intention more than children in the 
DD comparison group.  Interestingly, children with WS who did not receive affective cues and 












Group N % 
Williams Syndrome   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 8 66.7 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
9 75 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 5 41.7 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  12 100 
Proportion of Other Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration  
12 100 
   
Developmental Disabilities    
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 11 91.7 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
9 75 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 5 41.7 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  12 100 




Research Question 2 – Relationship between Developmental Status and Performance 
To examine if there was an association between developmental status (CA, VMA, and 
NVMA) and task performance (proportions of the target actions on the failed attempt 
administration, proportion of imitations of the failed intention on the failed intention 
administration, and proportion of other actions on both administrations), Spearman rho 
correlations were performed separately for both children with WS who received affective cues 
and those who did not receive affective cues (see Table 5.4 and 5.5).  It was hypothesized that 
developmental status would be positively associated with performing the target action on the 
failed intention administration; however, no statistically significant correlations were observed 




action on the target administration was positively associated NVMA (rs(11) = .70, p < .05) and 
VMA (rs(11) = .57, p = .07).  This indicates that as VMA and NVMA increases, children with 
WS who did not receive affective cues performed more target actions on the target 
administration and vice versa.  This pattern of performance was not statistically significant for 
children with WS who received affective cues.  Nonetheless, these correlation coefficients were 
in the same positive direction that was observed in children with WS who did not receive 
affective cues.  Thus, it is unclear whether this pattern of performance is specific to children who 
did not receive affect or if there was not enough power to reach statistical significance in the 
affect group.  Instead, CA was positively associated with performance on the target action on the 
target administration for children with WS who received affective cues (rs(13) = .70, p < .05).  
This suggests that for children with WS who received affective cues, as CA increased, more 
target actions were performed on the target administration.   
Table 5.4 
 
Relationship between Developmental Status and Performance – Affective Cues (N = 13) 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Chronological Age - .75* .70* .64* .14 .34 -.21 .00 
2. Verbal Mental Age - - .81** .22 .18 .41 .14 -.24 
3. Nonverbal Mental Age - - - .03 .24 .05 .13 .13 
4.  Proportion of Target Act on 
Target Administration 
- - - - -.28 .43 -.56* -.20 
5.  Proportion of Target Acts 
on Failed Intention 
Administration 
- - - - - -.29 .26 -.20 
6. Proportions of Imitations of 
the Failed Intention 
- - - - - - -.49 -.35 
7. Proportion of Other Acts on 
Target Administration  
- - - - - - - .12 
8. Proportion of Other Acts on 
Failed Intention 
Administration 






Relationship between Developmental Status and Performance – No Affective Cues (N = 12) 
 
# p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
It was also hypothesized that developmental status would be negatively correlated with 
imitating the failed intention.  For children with WS who did not receive affective cues, imitating 
the failed intention was negatively associated with CA (rs(11) = -.80, p < .01), VMA (rs(11) = -
.65, p < .05), and NVMA (rs(11) = -.65, p < .05).  This suggests that as developmental status 
increased, children who did not see affective cues performed fewer imitations of the failed 
intention.  This pattern of performance was not seen in children with WS who received affective 
cues.   
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Chronological Age - .42 .36 .16 -.35 -.80** -.28 -.17 
2. Verbal Mental Age - - .84** .57# .04 -.65* -.37 -.32 
3. Nonverbal Mental Age - - - .70* -.02 -.65* -.35 -.44 
4. Proportion of Target Act on 
Target Administration 
- - - - .33 -.41 -.40 -.80** 
5. Proportion of Target Acts on 
Failed Intention 
Administration 
- - - - - .22 -.08 -.57 
6. Proportions of Imitations of 
the Failed Intention 
- - - - - - .22 .27 
7. Proportion of Other Acts on 
Target Administration  
- - - - - - - .16 
8.  Proportion of Other Acts on 
Failed Intention 
Administration 




CHAPTER 6 – STUDY 1 DISCUSSION 
Past research has indicated that there may be a dissociation between social-perceptual and 
social-cognitive abilities in WS (Hepburn et al., 2011; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). The 
present study provides suggestive evidence of a dissociation of these abilities in the 
understanding of intentionality in this population.  We investigated this possible dissociation by 
examining differences in performance on an intentionality task, as measured by the behavioral 
reenactment procedure (Meltzoff, 1995), between two groups of children with WS: one that 
received affective cues and one that did not.  In this study, children with WS who received 
affective cues imitated the failed intention more than children with WS who did not receive 
affective cues.  This indicates that the presence of affective cues led children with WS to imitate 
the examiner more.  This is further supported by the findings that children with WS who 
received affective cues also produced the target action more on the target administration than 
children with WS who did not receive affective cues.  These findings suggest that the simple 
presence of affective cues led children with WS to imitate the examiner more during the 
behavioral reenactment procedure.   
Taken together, introducing affect to the behavioral reenactment procedure may have 
changed the nature of the task for children with WS who were presented with affect cues.  The 
presence of affective cues may have elicited a different set of responses for children with WS 
that are based within the affective system (i.e. the processing of emotional information separate 
from cognition or action; Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984) leading children with WS to imitate the 
examiner more.  Furthermore, these findings suggest that the presence of affect may not add 
support to social cognitive processes.  If this is the case, then the present study provides further 




(Hepburn et al., 2011; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) because these abilities appear to be 
working independently during perspective taking tasks when affect is present.  However, more 
research is needed to further explore and describe this dissociation in WS.         
Nonetheless, these findings add to the growing literature on intersubjectivity in WS and 
suggest that emotional cues may not facilitate the understanding of intentionality.  The present 
investigation further suggests that children with WS may be more skilled at sharing emotional 
experiences than interpreting what their social partner is intending to do.  While attending to the 
emotional aspects of the situation, children with WS may overlook the information they need to 
understand the actions and the perspective of their social partner.  In the present study, the 
presence of affect should have provided children with more information to use in order to 
interpret the failed intention of the examiner.  However for children with WS, affect did not 
facilitate interpretation.  Although the presence of affect facilitated higher rates of imitation in 
children with WS, this imitation did not seem to provide them with information to use to 
interpret their social partners mental state.  This finding is further supported by previous research 
on perspective taking and emotional responsivity in children with WS (Fidler et al., 2007; 
Hepburn et al., 2011; Laing et al., 2002).  
The ability to interpret the behavior of others in terms of mental states is critical for 
interacting in the social world (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Meltzoff, 2007 Tager-Flusberg et al., 
2006; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  To be able to interpret the mental state of a social partner, 
information is gathered from the emotional cues that are displayed during a social interaction 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  In many situations, emotional cues are a 
means to an end during social interaction because emotional displays can help to facilitate the 




not be the case for individuals with WS.  More research is needed to examine the role of emotion 
in interpreting the mental states of others’ in individuals with WS, to begin to understand how 
emotion is or is not supporting social cognition in this population.  Examination of the 
relationship between emotion and the understanding of others’ mental states would also provide 
further insight into the proposed dissociation between social-perceptual and social-cognitive 
abilities in WS.   
The present study also suggests that the understanding of intentionality does improve 
with developmental status for children with WS who did not receive affective cues, which is 
supported by previous research on the understanding of intentionality in typically developing 
children (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999, Bellagamba et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2005).  
However, this pattern of performance was not observed in children with WS who did receive 
affective cues.  This finding suggests that the presence of affective cues also altered the pattern 
of performance for children with WS, providing further support that emotional displays serve as 
a distraction for children with WS during this type of intersubjectivity task.    
When children with WS who did not receive affective cues were compared to children 
with DD, both groups performed the target action on the failed intention administration at the 
same rate.  This suggests that children with WS are not more skilled than children with DD on 
this type of intersubjectivity tasks.  One limitation of the present study was that there was no 
comparison between children with WS who received affective cues to children with DD who 
received affective cues.  Comparing performance on the intentionality task between children 
with WS and DD who received affective cues would provide further insight into how the 
presence of affective cues influences the understanding of intentionality.  Specifically, a 




provide insight into whether the frequency of imitations on the failed intention administration 





CHAPTER 7 - STUDY 2 METHOD 
Participants 
Participants for this study were 40 children with a confirmed diagnosis of DS.  There 
were two subgroups, young children with DS (24 to 57 months, N = 16) and older children with 
DS (59 to 136 months, N = 24).  The 16 young children with DS were compared to 16 CA, VMA 
and NVMA matched young children with DD (Idiopathic DD = 3, questionable/unknown 
etiology = 3, Cochayne syndrome = 2, Chromosome 18 = 2, Angelman’s syndrome = 1, DD with 
sensory integration disorder = 1, Smith Magenis syndrome = 1, velocardiofacial syndrome = 1, 
Sturge-Webber with Psychosis = 1, speech language delays = 1).  Young children with DS had a 
mean CA of 40.38 months, a mean VMA of 23.28 months, and a mean NVMA of 25.38 months 
(See Table 7.1 for developmental and demographic information).  Young children with DD had a 
mean CA of 39.69 months, a mean VMA of 27.59 months, and a mean NVMA of 28.07 months.  
Independent Samples t-tests were performed to examine differences between the two groups on 
CA, VMA, and NVMA.  No statistically significant differences were observed between young 
children with DS and children with DD on any of these dimensions.  Older children with DS had 




Participant Characteristics Study 2 
 










Characteristic M/% SD M/% SD  M/% SD 
Child       
CA (in months) 40.38 10.60 39.69 11.79 92.67 21.17 




Nonverbal MA (in 
months) 
25.38 7.34 28.07 8.73 49.33 10.75 
       
Child gender (% male) 64.7  4.8  75  
Child Ethnicity (%)       
Caucasian 70.6  62.5  87.5  
Hispanic 5.9  12.5  4.2  
More than 1 race 11.8  6.3  -  
Unknown/Choose not to 
respond 
11.7  18.7  8.3  
 
Participants were recruited through the Autism and Developmental Disability Research 
Groups at the University of Colorado Medical School, JFK Partners University Center for 
Excellence in Developmental Disabilities, parent support groups (Mile High Down Syndrome 
Association, Wyoming Down Syndrome Association), and local agencies.   
Data Collection 
The same data collection procedures that were used in Study 1 were also used in Study 2.  
As in Study 1, these tasks were counter-balanced and administered in two sessions in order to 
reduce participant fatigue and promote participant attention and engagement.  
Matching.  Young children with DS in were matched to children with DD on CA, VMA, 
and NVMA.  This type of matching has been used in other studies involving children with 
developmental disabilities (e.g. Fidler et al., 2005; 2007; 2008; Kasari et al., 1995; 2001; Kasari 
& Freeman, 2001; Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003; Mervis et al., 2003; Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998; Zelazo et al., 1996).         
Group Differences.  As in Study 1, group differences were assessed by using an 
independent samples t-test to compare young children with DS to children with DD on the 




observed between young children with DS and children with DD, which enabled the researchers 
to make comparisons between the two groups.   
Measures 
The same measures used in Study 1 were also used in Study 2 (Child information sheet, 
Mullen Scales of Early Learning [Mullen, 1995], Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised 
[Roid & Miller, 1995; 1997], and the Intentionality Task).  However in Study 2, there was no 
administration of affective display procedures for the intentionality task.  Also, for 40% of the 
administrations of the intentionality task, there were only 2 administrations of the target actions 
because of problems with the toys.  In addition to these measures, the Oral and Written Language 
Scales was administered as a measure of verbal mental age for children who only received the 
Leiter-R.  Also, the Early Social Communication Scale was used to examine joint attention and 
affect sharing in young children with DS.  Finally, the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive 
Function – Preschool Version was used to examine executive function abilities in older children 
with DS. These measures are described below.   
Coding.  Two coders (undergraduate research assistants) who were unaware of the 
study’s research questions coded the data (see Appendix 1 for coding scheme).  As in Study 1, 
Cohen’s kappa was calculated for 20% of the videos to establish interrater reliability (kappa = 
.84).  The same coding processes for the intentionality task described in Study 1 were used in 
this study with the exception of coding for facial, vocal, and gestural behaviors.   
Oral and Written Language Scale.  The Oral and Written Language Scale (OWLS; 
Carrow-Woolfolk, 1996) is a standardized measure of expressive and receptive language.  The 
OWLS has been normed on children and adolescents ages 3-21.  Only the Listening 




Comprehension Scale is a receptive language measure that involves responding to prompts by 
indicating an answer with a nonverbal response (pointing to a picture on a page).  The Oral 
Expression Scale involves answering a question, completing a sentence, or generating a sentence 
in response to a verbal or visual stimulus.  The OWLS reports both high test-retest reliability 
(.73-.89) and high interrater reliability (.93-.99; Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995; 2008).  It also has 
demonstrated both content and construct validity (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995; 2008).  The OWLS 
demonstrates high convergent and discriminant validity with other measures (i.e. Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised [Dunn & Dunn, 198], Test for Auditory Comprehension of 
Language Revised [Carrow-Woolfolk, 1985], Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-
Revised [Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 1987], Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children [Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 1983], Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition [Wechsler, 1991]; 
Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995; 2008).    
Early Social Communications Scale.  The Early Social Communication Scale (ESCS; 
Seibert, Hogan & Mundy, 1982), as described in Mundy, Sigman, and Kasari (1990), was 
designed to elicit examples of intentional communication (i.e., requests), joint attention behavior 
(e.g., following and initiating), and affect sharing.  This consists of a series of social-
communicative interactions with an experimenter and a set of toys in a semi-structured play 
interview.  For the purpose of this study, only the joint attention (following joint attention and 
initiating joint attention) and affect sharing variables were used.  Coding of behaviors was based 
on the frequency of occurrence of Requesting, Joint Attention, and Social Interaction behaviors, 
which involves classifying the function of the behavior, identifying who initiated the function, 
and identifying the behavior code (Mundy et al., 1990).  Finally, the duration of the behaviors 




Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function – Preschool Version.  The 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function – Preschool Version (BRIEF-P, Gioia, Espy, 
& Isquith, 2003) is a 63-item standardized rating scale assesses executive function in preschool 
aged children.  The BRIEF-P assesses five different aspects of executive function (inhibit, shift, 
emotional control, working memory, and plan/organize) and can be used to calculate one 
composite score (Global Executive Composite) of overall executive function.  Also, the five 
domains of executive function are combined to form three index scales: Inhibitory Self-Control, 
Flexibility, and Emergent Metacognition.  The BRIEF-P’s normative sample includes reports 
from 460 parents and 302 teachers of children age 2 to 5 years. The BRIEF-P reports both high 
test-retest reliability for parent reports (.78-.90) and high internal consistency for (.80-.97; Gioia 
et al., 2003). It demonstrates convergent and discriminant validity with other measures of 
behavior and the authors used confirmatory factor analyses to validate their conceptual model of 
executive function. 
For the present study, the BRIEF-P parent report form was used instead of the school-
aged BRIEF parent report form.  Recent research using the school-aged version of the BRIEF in 
children with DS suggests that not all the items were applicable to school-aged children with DS 
(Lee et al., 2011).  However, the items on the BRIEF-P were found to be more appropriate for 
the developmental level of school-age children with DS (Lee et al., 2011).  In order to calculate 
scores on the BRIEF-P, the child’s mental aged from the Leiter-R was used instead of their 
chronological age. 
Data Analysis 
 As in Study 1, a proportion was made for the performance of target actions, imitations of 




magnitude of the relationship between task performance, joint attention, and affect sharing in 
young children with DS.  Also, Spearman rho correlations were used to examine task 
performance and executive function abilities in older children with DS.  Spearman rho was used 
because the proportion created for performance was treated as an ordinal variable.  To examine if 
other domains of cognition predicted performance on the intentionality task in children with DS, 
multiple linear regression analyses were performed.  For younger children with DS, the 
proportion of target actions on the failed intention administration and imitations of the failed 
intention were used as outcome variables and joint attention and affect sharing were used as 
predictor variables.  For older children with DS, the same outcome variables were used, but the 
predictor variables were raw scores on the BRIEF-P.  
To examine the age related differences of intentionality in children with DS, linear 
regression analyses were performed.  For these regressions, the proportion of target actions on 
the failed intention administration and imitations of the failed intention were used as outcome 
variables, and developmental status (i.e. CA, VMA, and NVMA) was used as the predictor 
variable.   In order to further describe performance on the intentionality task in children with DS, 
relative likelihood statistics and the confidence intervals associated with those statistics were 
used. This approach was used because it offers a simple interpretation of the relative differences 
in performance between the two groups (Fidler et al., 2007), which may be more informative 
than the magnitude of the difference when the proportions are close to zero (Agresti & Finlay, 
2009).  Also, use of this statistic allows for an easy interpretation of the relative differences 
between the two groups because a relative likelihood statistic of 2, for example, means that one 
group was twice as likely to perform an action than the other group (Fidler et al., 2007).  Relative 




in this study to compare performance on the intentionality task between young children with DS 





CHAPTER 8 – STUDY 2 RESULTS 
Research Question 1 – Relationship between Performance and Other Domains of Cognition  
For young children with DS, it was hypothesized that task performance on the 
intentionality task would be correlated with joint attention and affect sharing abilities.  Table 8.1 
presents the Spearman rho correlations for task performance, joint attention, and affect sharing.   
Performing an “other action” (e.g. any action the child performs other than the target action or 
imitation of the failed intention) on the failed intention administration was negatively correlated 
with both joint attention (rs(14) = -.69, p < .01) and affect sharing (rs(14) = -.57, p < .05).  This 
suggests that for young children with DS, an increase in the performance of “other actions” 
during the intentionality task was related to lower levels of joint attention and affect sharing 
abilities and vice versa.  Also, a marginally significant positive correlation was found between 
imitations of the failed intention and affect sharing (rs(14) = .49, p = .07).  This indicates that as 
affect sharing abilities increase, young children with DS perform more imitations of the intention 
and vice versa.  No other statistically significant associations were found between task 
performance and joint attention or affect sharing.         
Table 8.1 
 
Relationship between Performance, Joint Attention, and Affect Sharing (N = 16) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Proportion of Target Act on 
Target Administration 
- .33 .34 -.35 -.17 .38 .30 
2.  Proportion of Target Acts on 
Failed Intention 
Administration 
- - -.27 .12 .17 .32 .17 
3.  Proportions of Imitations of 
the Failed Intention 
- - - .18 -.63** .38 .49# 
4.  Proportion of Other Acts on 
Target Administration 
- - - - -.16 .16 .42 
5.  Proportion of Other Acts on 
Failed Intention 




#p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
A multiple regression was conducted to examine if performance on the intentionality task 
(performance of the target action on the failed intention administration and imitations of the 
failed intention) could be predicted from joint attention and affect sharing abilities in young 
children with DS.  The results of this analysis indicated that a significant model emerged for 
imitations of the failed intention, F(2,11) = 9.73, p < .01 (see Table 8.2).  Approximately 64% of 
the variance in imitating the failed intention can be accounted for by the linear combination of 
joint attention and affect sharing.  The regression equation for the prediction of imitating the 
failed intention is: Predicted Imitation of the Failed Intention = -.01 Joint Attention + .42 Affect 
Sharing - .11.  Examination of the predictor variables showed a significant effect for affect 
sharing, such that young children with DS who had higher levels of affect sharing performed 
more imitations of the failed intention.   
Table 8.2 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on the Intentionality Task from Joint 
Attention and Affect Sharing (N=13) 
 Target Actions Imitations of the Failed 
Intention 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Joint Attention .30 .19 .47 -.01 .09 -.03 
Affect Sharing -.24 .20 -.35 .42 .10 .81** 
R
2 
  .20 .64  
F(2,11)   1.40 9.73  
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
Administration 
6.  Joint Attention - - - - - - .67** 




For older children with DS, it was hypothesized that task performance on the 
intentionality task would be correlated with parent report of executive function abilities as 
measured by the BRIEF-P.  BRIEF-P raw scores were used because using the raw scores 
provides a measure of actual EF skills, globally, not a measure of EF that is standardized for 
chronological or mental age.  The only type of task performance that was associated with EF was 
performing “other actions” on the target administration (see Table 8.3).  Specifically, there was a 
negative correlation between performing an action other than the target action on the target 
administration and both the Global Executive Composite (rs(19) = -.48, p < .05) and Emotional 
Control (rs(20) = -.45, p < .05).  These findings suggest that children with DS who perform more 
“other actions” on the target administration have lower scores on the Global Executive 
Composite and Emotional Control as measured by the BRIEF-P and vice versa.  Also, there were 
marginally significant negative correlations with performing any other action on the target 
administration and the Flexibility Index (rs(20) = -.43, p = .06), Inhibitory Self-Control (rs(20) = 
-.41, p = .07), and Emergent Metacognition (rs(19) = -.40, p = .09).  This suggests that children 
with DS who perform more “other actions” on the target administration may have lower scores 
on the Flexibility Index, Inhibitory Self-Control, and Emergent Metacognition as measured by 






Relationship between Performance and Executive Function (N =24) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Proportion of Target 
Act on Target 
Administration 
- .23 .45* -.57** -.31 .27 .34 .12 .11 .13 .27 -.08 .16 .14 
2.  Proportion of 
Target Acts on 
Failed Intention 
Administration 
- - -.08 -.23 -.57** .11 .002 .10 .25 .11 -.11 .32 .23 -.01 
3.  Proportions of 
Imitations of the 
Failed Intention 
- - - -.17 -.11 -.02 .11 .11 -.21 -.25 .15 -.07 .22 .18 
4. Proportion of Other 
Acts on Target 
Administration  
- - - - .29 -.48* -.40# -.43# -.41# -.31 -.32 -.45* .22 -.23 
5. Proportion of Other 
Acts on Failed 
Intention 
Administration  
- - - - - -.06 .03 -.05 -.05 -.01 -.09 -.05 .31 .10 
6.  Global Executive 
Composite 
- - - - - - .93** .86** .92** .82** .77** .74** .32 .86** 
7. Emergent 
Metacognition 
- - - - - - - .67** .79** .77** .65** .51* .52* .90** 
8. Flexibility Index 
 
- - - - - - - - .72** .49* .85** .89** .24 .77** 
9. Inhibitory Self-
Control 
- - - - - - - - - .92** .53* .75** .25 .68** 
10. Inhibit 
 
- - - - - - - - - - .38 .49* .09 .61** 




*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
12. Emotional Control 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - .29 .60** 
13. Working Memory 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - .52* 
14. Plan/Organize 
 





 To further examine the relationship between EF and performance on the intentionality 
task, linear regressions were conducted.  These analyses examined whether performance of target 
actions on the failed intention administration and imitations of the failed intention would be 
predicted by EF abilities as measured by the BRIEF-P.  No statistically significant regression 
models were observed for the prediction of performance of target actions or imitation of the 
failed intention from EF abilities.   Because statistically significant correlations were found 
between performance of other actions on the target actions and some of the domains of the 
BRIEF-P, linear regressions were performed to further explore the relationship between these 
skills and performance of other actions on the target administration.  Statistically significant 
linear regression models did emerge for the prediction of performance of “other actions” on the 
target administration from the Global Executive Composite, Emotional Control, the Flexibility 
Index, Emergent Metacognition, and the Inhibitory Self-Control Index.  
 The statistically significant results of the linear regression predicting the performance of 
“other actions” from the Global Executive Composite are presented in Table 8.4, F(1,18) = 7.17, 
p < .05 (95% CI = -.02 to -.002).  Global Executive Composite scores explained approximately 
30% of the variance in performance of “other actions” on the target action.  The regression 
equation for the prediction of performance of “other actions” on the target administration is: 
Predicted Other Actions = -.01 Global Executive Composite + 1.66.  These findings suggest that 
older children with DS who have lower Global Executive Composite scores performed more 











Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on of other Action from the Global 
Executive Composite Task (N=19) 
 Other Action on Target 
Administration 
Variable B SE B β 
Global Executive 
Composite  




F(1,18) 7.17  
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
Similarly, the linear regression predicting the performance of “other actions” from 
Emotional Control was statistically significant, F(1,18) = 10.55, p < .01 (95% CI = -.07 to -.01; 
see Table 8.5).  Emotional Control explained approximately 70% of the variance in performance 
of “other actions” on the target action.  The regression equation for the prediction of performance 
of “other actions” on the target administration is: Predicted Other Actions = -.04 Emotional 
Control + 1.29.  Results suggest that older children with DS who have lower levels of Emotional 
Control produced more “other actions” on the target administration.   
Table 8.5 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on of Other Actions from Emotional 
Control (N=19) 
 Other Action on Target 
Administration 
Variable B SE B β 




F(1,18) 10.55  





Table 8.6 presents the statistically significant linear regression predicting the 
performance of “other actions” from the Flexibility Index, F(1,18) = 5.80, p < .01 (95% CI = -.03 
to -.002), which indicates that older children with DS who had lower scores on the Flexibility 
Index performed more “other actions” on the target administration.  The Flexibility Index 
explained approximately 24% of the variance in performance of other actions on the target 
action.  The regression equation for the prediction of performance of other actions on the target 
administration is: Predicted Other Actions = - .02 Flexibility Index + 1.23. 
Table 8.6 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on of Other Actions from the 
Flexibility Index (N=19) 
 Other Action on Target 
Administration 
Variable B SE B β 




F(1,18) 5.80  
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
The linear regression predicting the performance of “other actions” from Emergent 
Metacognition was also statistically significant, F(1,18) = 5.38, p < .01 (95% CI = -.05 to -.002; 
see Table 8.7).  Emergent Metacognition explained approximately 24% of the variance in 
performance of “other actions” on the target action.  The regression equation for the prediction of 
performance of “other actions” on the target administration is: Predicted Other Actions = -.02 
Emergent Metacognition + 1.90.  These findings indicated that older children with DS who have 








Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on of Other Actions from Emergent 
Metacognition (N=19) 
 Other Action on Target 
Administration 
Variable B SE B β 




F(1,18) 5.38  
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
Finally, the linear regression predicting the performance of other actions from the 
Inhibitory Self-Control Index was statistically significant, F(1,18) = 8.41, p < .01 (95% CI = -.03 
to -.01, see Table 8.8).  This suggests that older children with DS who have lower scores on the 
Inhibitory Self-Control Index performed more “other actions” on the target administration.   The 
Inhibitory Self-Control Index explained approximately 32% of the variance in performance of 
“other actions” on the target action.  The regression equation for the prediction of performance of 
“other actions” on the target administration is: Predicted Other Actions = -.02 Inhibitory Self-
Control Index + 1.41.  
Table 8.8 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on of Other Actions from Inhibitory 
Self-Control Index (N=19) 
 Other Action on Target 
Administration 
Variable B SE B β 




F(1,18) 8.41  





Research Question 2 – Trajectory of the Understanding Intentionality 
 To examine whether the understanding of intentionality in children with DS improves 
with developmental status (CA, VMA, and NVMA), multiple regressions were performed.  
Table 8.9 presents the results of these analyses.  These analyses included developmental status as 
predictors and the proportion of target actions performed on the failed intention administration 
and imitations of the failed intention as outcome variables.  
Table 8.9 
 
Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Performance on the Intentionality Task from 
Developmental Status (N=36) 
 Target Actions on the 
Failed Intention 
administration 
Imitations of the 
Failed Intention 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Chronological Age -.007 .003 -.60* .001 .002 .16 
Verbal Mental Age -.002 .005 -.11 -.005 .003 -.40 
Nonverbal Mental Age .02 .008 .92* .003 .006 .22 
R
2 
  .22 .09  
F(3, 33)   3.15* 1.04  
*p < .05 **p < .01  
 
Of the two regression performed, a significant model emerged only for performing the 
target action on the failed intention administration, F(3,33) = 3.15, p < .05 (95% CI = -.03-.55).  
Approximately 22% of the variance of performance on target actions on the failed intention 
administration can be accounted for by the linear combination of developmental status.  The 
regression equation for the prediction of performance of target actions on the failed intention 
administration is: Predicted Performance of Target Actions = -.007 CA - .002 VMA +.02 NVMA 
+.26.  Examination of the predictor variables showed a significant effect for NVMA, such that 




administration.  Also, a significant effect for CA was found, such that children with DS who 
were older, chronologically, performed less target actions on the failed intention administration.   
 To further examine the relative difference in performance on the intentionality task 
between young and older children with DS, relative likelihood ratios were calculated for each 
group.  Results indicate that while both groups performed the target action often on both the 
target and failed intention administration (see Table 8.10), older children with DS imitated the 
failed intention more than young children with DS (relative likelihood = 1.33, 95% CI = .48 to 
3.70).    
Table 8.10 
 




Group N % 
Young Children with DS   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 15 93.8 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
13 81.2 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 4 25 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  15 93.8 
Proportion of Other Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration  
16 100 
   
Older Children with DS   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 22 91.7 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
20 83.3 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 8 33.3 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  21 87.5 




It was further hypothesized that performance on the intentionality task would be similar 




the target action on the target administration, almost all young children with DS and all of the 
children with DD performed the target action on the target administration.  However, 81.2% of 
young children with DS performed the target action during the failed intention administration, 
compared to 68.8% of young children with DD (see Table 8.11).  Therefore, young children with 
DS were 18% more likely to produce the target action on the failed intention administration 
(95% CI .79 to 1.77) than children with DD.  Young children with DD, on the other hand, were 
50% more likely to imitate the failed intention (relative likelihood = 1.5, 95% CI .52 to 4.32) 
than young children with DS.   
Table 8.11 
 




Group N % 
Young Children with DS   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 15 93.8 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
13 81.2 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 4 25 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  15 93.8 
Proportion of Other Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration  
16 100 
   
Young Children with DD   
Proportion of Target Act on Target Administration 16 100 
Proportion of Target Acts on Failed Intention 
Administration 
11 68.8 
Proportions of Imitations of the Failed Intention 6 37.5 
Proportion of Other Acts on Target Administration  16 100 








CHAPTER 9 – STUDY 2 DISCUSSION 
 The first goal of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between the understanding of 
intentionality and other cognitive abilities in children with DS (i.e. joint attention and affect 
sharing in young children with DS, and EF skills in older children with DS).  With the exception 
of marginally significant relationship between imitating the failed intention and affect sharing in 
young children with DS, there were no statistically significant associations between these skills 
and performance of target actions on the failed intention administration or imitations of the failed 
intention in either age group.  However, an interesting pattern of performance emerged for both 
age groups for performance of “other actions”.   
In young children with DS, lower levels of joint attention and affect sharing were related 
to the production of more “other actions” on the failed intention administration.  Past research on 
joint attention has produced two contrasting views of this ability.  One line of research indicates 
that children with DS have difficulties with joint attention (Cebula & Wishart, 2008; Legerstee & 
Weintraub, 1997).  The other line of research indicates that children with DS have appropriate 
levels of joint attention (Fidler et al., 2005; Kasari et al., 1995; Mundy et al., 1988; Sigman & 
Ruskin, 1999). Taken together, it is possible that some young children with DS have difficulties 
with joint attention, while other children with DS have developmentally appropriate levels of 
joint attention.  If this were the case, it would explain the findings in the current study.  In order 
to interpret the target action during the failed intention administration, children needed to use 
joint attention skills to gain the necessary information to successfully perform the action.  
Children with DS who have lower levels of joint attention may have missed the information 
needed to successfully perform the target action, which led them to perform “other actions” with 




For older children with DS, performance of “other actions” on the target administration 
was associated with poorer performance on the Global Executive Composite, the Flexibility 
Index, the Inhibitory Self-Control Index, Emergent Metacognition, and Emotional Control.  The 
Global Executive Composite is a summary measure of the child’s overall executive function 
ability.   The other domains focus on the child’s ability to self-regulate, to self-manage tasks, to 
apply information from working memory to guide their actions, and the ability to shift, or move, 
between actions, behaviors, emotions, and response (Gioia et al., 2003).  When examining the 
design of the intentionality task, it appears that all of these skills are necessary to successfully 
interpret the failed intentional information and perform the target action.  As a result, older 
children with DS may have produce “other actions” because they knew they were supposed to do 
something with the toys, but did not have the skill set (i.e. planning, working, memory, 
inhibition, and shifting) to produce them. These findings add support to research by Zelazo and 
colleagues (1996), indicating that EF abilities influence theory of mind in individuals with DS. 
The present study also examined the age-related changes in the understanding of 
intentionality in children with DS.  The current findings suggest that the understanding of 
intentionality improves with developmental status in young children with DS.  This finding is in 
line with past research on the understanding of intentionality in typically developing children 
(Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999, Bellagamba et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2005).  Older children 
with DS imitated the failed intention more than younger children with DS.  This finding is 
particularly interesting considering that young children with DS also performed the target action 
more on the failed intention administration than MA-matched children with DD.  There are two 
possible explanations for this finding.  First, past research has suggested that cognitive 




in that it tends to slow and show greater variability in ability over the course of development 
(Carr, 1995; Dunst, 1990; Hodapp & Zigler, 1990; Hodapp, Evans, & Gray, 1999; Wishart, 
1993; Wishart & Duffy, 1990).  Therefore, these findings may provide suggestive evidence that 
children with DS have a better understanding of intentionality in early childhood than they do in 
middle childhood.  However, it is also possible that the intentionality task used in this study was 
not developmentally appropriate for children with in the older DS group.  The understanding of 
intentionality as not been examined in children over the age of 4 years.  Therefore, it is possible 
that the behavioral reenactment procedure is not an effective measure of intentionality in older 
children.   Future longitudinal research is needed to examine the development of intentionality in 
order to further characterize this pattern of performance.  Also, future research should examine 
the appropriateness of the behavioral reenactment procedure in measuring intentionality in older 
children.  This research may add insight into research on theory of mind in individuals with DS 
because the understanding of intentionality is an important precursor for theory of mind 
(Meltzoff, 2007; 1995).  Nonetheless, the current study has taken an important first step in 





CHAPTER 10 – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the understanding of intentionality in 
children with two neurogenetic disorders, WS and DS.  Neurogenetic disorders can influence 
development by predisposing an individual to particular patterns of behaviors and abilities (i.e. 
directly; Dykens, 1995; Hodapp, 2004).  In addition, the characteristics of an individual with a 
neurogenetic disorder may elicit specific reactions and responses from others that in turn lead to 
certain patterns of behaviors and abilities (i.e. indirectly; Hodapp, 2004; Hodapp & DesJardin, 
2002; Scarr & McCartney, 1983).   
To investigate the complex issues of how neurogenetic disorders influence behavior, 
researchers have focused on characterizing the behavioral phenotypes associated with 
neurogenetic disorders in order to identify areas of strength and challenge (Dykens, 1995; 
Hodapp, 2004; Hodapp & DesJardin, 2002).  This dissertation examined whether WS and DS 
predispose children to specific areas of strength and challenge in the understanding of 
intentionality.  Overall, the findings of this dissertation indicate that the understanding of 
intentionality improves with developmental status for both children with WS and DS, a finding 
that has also been observed in typically developing children (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999, 
Bellagamba et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2005).  However, within each group, specific patterns of 
performance emerged on the intentionality task.   
The findings from study 1 suggest that during perspective taking tasks, young children 
with WS are more likely to share in the emotional experience with their social partner than to try 
to interpret their social partner’s intentions.  As such, this dissertation highlights the potential 
confounding influence of emotional displays when examining social cognitive abilities in 




WS who observed emotional displays during the administration of the behavioral reenactment 
procedure attended to the emotional information provided during the task rather than the social 
cognitive information they were presented with.  Children with WS who did not receive the 
administration of affective cues, on the other hand, were more successful at interpreting a failed 
attempted using the social cognitive information they observed.   
Difficulties in the understanding of intentionality may influence the subsequent social 
development in WS.  The frequently reported challenges in the area of complex social cognitive 
skills in WS, such as perspective taking, attributing mental states, theory of mind, and social 
decision making (Davies et al., 1998; Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998) may be related to difficulties in 
understanding intentionality because viewing others as intentional beings is fundamental to these 
skills (Tager-Flusberg, 2005).   Furthermore, it is possible that early deficits in understanding 
intentionality may explain part of why individuals with WS struggle with making and 
maintaining friends because friendships are supported by our ability to understand the 
motivations and intentions of a social partner (Davies et al., 1998; Enifeld et al., 1997; 
Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-Cohen, 1995; Mervis & Kline-Tasman, 2000; 
Udwin & Yule, 1991).   
It is also possible that the social phenotype associated with WS in early childhood and 
infancy has a cascading, or indirect, effect on the understanding of intentionality (Tager-
Flusberg, 2005).  As suggested by Fidler, Lunkenheimer, and Hahn (2011), there is a 
hypothesized model of cascading effects associated with the WS social profile, such that the 
hypersocial profile that emerges in childhood and adolescence (Jarvinen-Pasley et al., 2008), is 




early intersubjective constraints may have a cascading effect on the understanding of 
intentionality.  However, to date, there is no research that longitudinally explores the emergence 
of the behavioral phenotype associated with WS.  In order to fully examine the potential 
cascading effects proposed in the present study, longitudinal studies are needed.  
The influence of affective cues on performance on the intentionality task adds more 
information to the claims of Huang and colleagues (2002; 2005) that there are other processes 
influencing children’s performance on the behavioral reenactment procedure (Meltzoff, 1995).  
Huang and colleagues (2002; 2005) suggest that intentional imitation, emulation, and mimicry 
are active processes in performance on the intentionality task, which leads children to use 
imitation rather than intention reading to interpret the failed intentional actions of the examiner.  
However, imitation can either be purposeful in that it facilitates perspective taking during social 
cognitive situations (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998), or it can simply serve the purposes of emotion 
sharing (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  Therefore, it is possible that imitation could be used to 
support the understanding of intentionality.    
The present study attempted to examine the influence of imitation in understanding 
intentionality by administering the intentionality task with and without affective cues to children 
with WS.  Because of the social phenotype associated with WS and the tendency for imitation, if 
imitation was influencing performance on the intentionality task (Huang et al., 2002; 2005), then 
children with WS, especially those who received affective cues, should have produced more 
target actions.  However, children with WS in both groups performed the target action on the 
failed intention with the same frequency.  From the findings of this study, a more appropriate, 
and perhaps more important, question that arises about the role of imitation in the behavioral 




Therefore, the present study does not support or reject the claims made by Huang and colleagues 
(2002; 2005), but adds another dimension of imitation to consider when using the behavioral 
reenactment procedure to investigate the understanding of intentionality.   
Similarly, study 2 of this dissertation examines how other cognitive abilities influence the 
understanding of intentionality as measured by the behavioral reenactment procedure.  In the 
present study, older children with DS who had poorer EF skills performed more “other actions” 
on the behavioral reenactment procedure.  These findings add support to Huang and colleagues’ 
(2002; 2005) claims that there are other skills influencing the performance of children on the 
behavioral reenactment procedure.  These findings further suggest that the phenotypic 
characteristics of children with DS may have a cascading effect on the understanding of 
intentionality.  Specifically, it is possible that difficulties in joint attention (Cebula & Wishart, 
2008; Legerstee & Weintraub, 1997) and EF (Lee et al., 2011) lead children with DS to miss the 
target relevant information during the behavioral reenactment procedure leading them to perform 
more “other actions”.  However, more longitudinal research is needed to examine the influence 
of these skills on the understanding of intentionality.     
Although the understanding of intentionality (as measured by the behavioral reenactment 
procedure) did improve with developmental status for children with DS, older children with DS 
produced more imitations of the failed intention than young children with DS.  These findings 
may indicate that, like other cognitive abilities in DS, the development of the understanding of 
intentionality may be qualitatively different in older children with DS as compared to young 
children with DS (Carr, 1995; Dunst, 1990; Hodapp & Zigler, 1990; Hodapp et al., 1999; 
Wishart, 1993; Wishart & Duffy, 1990).  However, it is also possible that these findings suggest 




It is notable, however, that in young children with WS who did not receive affective cues and 
young children with DS, correctly interpreting the target action during the failed intention 
administration was similar to the performance of MA-matched children with DD.  Therefore, in 
children with WS and DS, the ability to view a social partner’s actions as intentional and 
correctly interpret their failed intention, does not appear to be an area of particular strength or 
weakness.       
Limitations 
 There are some important limitations to the present study.  The sample sizes in the 
present dissertation were small, and only the parameters of interests could only be estimated 
from these samples.  Therefore, the findings presented in this dissertation should be interpreted 
with caution.  Also, both of these samples were non-random samples, which means that 
inference is not entirely valid.  For this reason, the present dissertation examined group 
differences using percentages and likelihood ratios. Furthermore, confidence intervals were 
included because they provide the range of possible values of the likelihood ratios.  In addition, 
both of the current studies were cross-sectional; therefore, it was not possible to examine the 
trajectory of development of intentionality.  In order to truly characterize the development of 
intentionality in WS and DS, longitudinal studies with larger sample sizes are necessary.   
In the present dissertation, a comparison group of MA-matched children with DD was 
available only for the young DS and the WS no affect groups.  In order to fully understand the 
influence of affective cues on the understanding of intentionality in WS, future studies need to 
incorporate a comparison group of MA-matched children with DD who received affective cues.  
Also, although the present study suggests that the understanding of intentionality in older 




Hodapp, Evans, & Gray, 1999; Wishart, 1993; Wishart & Duffy, 1990), tends to slow and show 
greater variability in ability over the course of development, it is not possible to know if this is 
actually the case without a comparison group of MA-matched children with DD.  Furthermore, 
for both studies, the addition of a typically developing MA-matched comparison group may 
provide insight into how the understanding of intentionality in WS and DS is similar or different 
from typically developing children.   
 Conclusions 
This dissertation is the first study to examine the development of intentionality in WS and 
DS.  Examining the understanding of intentionality in these populations is important to better 
understand the development of intersubjectivity, theory of mind, and social cognition in WS and 
DS.  Study 1 adds further evidence to past research on perspective taking and theory of mind in 
WS, indicating that there may be a dissociation between social-perceptual and social-cognitive 
skills in this population during early social-emotional development.  Specifically, it seems that 
the presence of emotional cues during intersubjective tasks leads to an emotional response 
instead of a response based on social cognition.  Future studies should continue to explore this 
dissociation in order to examine the potential cascading effect of these abilities on later 
development.  Study 2 provides suggestive evidence that the understanding of intentionality may 
follow a qualitatively different trajectory in children with DS.  In addition, overall findings from 
this study suggest that, the understanding of intentionality improves with developmental status in 
children with WS and DS.  However, in order to characterize the development of intentionality 
longitudinal research is needed.   
Both of the studies in this dissertation highlight the potential cascading effects of 




profile (Gosch & Pankau, 1997; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000) leads children with WS to focus 
on more on the social and emotional aspects of the intentionality task, especially when affect is 
present, rather than the social cognitive information they need to attend to in order to interpret 
the intentional actions of a social partner.  For young children with DS, having appropriate levels 
of joint attention (Fidler et al., 2005; Kasari et al., 1995; Mundy et al., 1988; Sigman & Ruskin, 
1999) leads children with DS to be more successful at understanding the intentions of others.  It 
is possible that young children with DS who experience deficits in joint attention (Cebula & 
Wishart, 2008; Legerstee & Weintraub, 1997) miss the intentional information needed to 
interpret the intentions of others.  In addition, recent research on EF in children with DS has 
provided evidence of deficits in all domains of EF (Lee et al., 2011) and that EF skills influence 
the understanding of theory of mind (Zelazo et al., 1996).  Therefore, it seems that EF skills also 
influence the understanding of intentionality, which is supported by research EF and theory of 
mind in typically developing children (Carlson et al., 2004a; Carlson et al., 2004b; Hughes, & 
Ensor, 2007; Rakoczy, 2010).  More research is needed to examine the relationship between EF 
and theory of mind in DS, including early theory of mind abilities such as intentionality and 
perspective taking.  Further characterizing social cognition in WS and DS will help to identify 
areas for targeted intervention to prevent the possible cascading effects of difficulties in social 
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Intentionality Task Coding Scheme 
Adapted from Meltzoff (1995) 
 
Conditions 
Target condition: the experimenter models the entire target action with the toy 
successfully.   
Failed Intention condition: the experimenter tries to do the target action, but is 
unsuccessful.  They fail to perform the action.    
 
Directions –  
1. Circle the objects being used 
2. Make sure the child does not produce the target act during play time – if so make a note 
under the trial and whether or not the made sure to do a different action 
3. Circle whether it was the target act or failed intention 
4. Code (see definitions below) 
a. Target = target action, no action, other action 
i. For some children performing the target action was difficult because they are 
not strong enough to perform the action or they have poor motor skills.  
Trying is defined as actively trying to complete the action.  This means that 
the child would have completed the task if they were stronger or had better 
motor skills 
b. Failed Intetion = target action, no action, other action, imitate failed intention 
i. What the first action was, and if it was the target act or failed intention 
ii. If the target act or failed intention was completed in 20 seconds 
c. No action = they do nothing with the objects (just holding them is no action) 
d. Other action = any other action then the ones listed, this has to be an action that 
they do with the items! 
e. Child Affective Displays 
i. Facial  
1. Concentration/trying - Furrows brow 
2. surprise – eyes wide, eye brows up, mouth open (maybe smile) 
3. happy/joy –  smile 
4. frown—corner of the lips turned downward 
5. purse or bite lips 
6. Other –please indicate 
ii. Vocal  
1. Look what I can do, can I have a turn, let me try, any variation  




6. Motor sound 
7. Other – please indicate 





2. Hands out and open  
3. Hangs head 
4. clenches fist 
5. other 
5. for actions in 20 sec circle all that you see in that time, once trail is done circle if they 
produced the target act or failed attempt at any time during the admin even after the 20 
sec response time 
6. circle all child behaviors seen during the admin, make sure that when you circle other you 
write what it is. 
7. Definitions 
a. Cylinder, beads and stick 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child) –  
1. gather up beads and puts in cylinder, it is ok if they hit the side of 
the cup on the way in  
2. Alternate 1: Hold the beads so they hang above the table and hit 
them with the stick so they swing like a pendulum. 
3. Alternate 2: Place cup upside down on the table and then place the 
stick across the top forming a “T” shape 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Attempt to deposit the necklace in the container, but miss. Make 
three attempts, dropping the beads on three separate sides of the 
container. 
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to hit the beads with the stick but miss – 
missing in front (too short), under, and over. 
3. Alternate 2: Place the cup upside down on the table. Attempt to 
place the stick across the top of the cup to form a “T” but have the 
stick roll of the top.  
iii. Imitation by child 
1. gather up the beads and dangle them like the examiner so that they 
hit the rim and fall down the side of the cylinder 
2. Alternate 1: miss hitting the beads in the same manner and order 
as the examiner 
3. Alternate 2: Place the cup upside down on the table. Attempt to 
place the stick across the top of the cup to form a “T”, push the 
stick roll of the top 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
b. Prong and loops 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child)   
1. raise the nylon loop up to the prong and drape it over it. 
2. Alternate 1: Drape the loop over your hand like a bracelet. 
3. Alternate 2: Drape the loop over your right ear. 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. try but fail to place the loop over the prong, each time releasing the 




the left, then too far to the right and finally too low, so that if falls 
to the table directly below the prong.  
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to drape the loop over your hand like a 
bracelet. This should be done three times – missing to the right, 
left, and under. 
3. Alternate 2: Attempt to drape the loop over your right ear but miss 
and let the loop fall.  
iii. Imitation by child 
1. try to place the loop over the prong, each time they release it 
similarly to the examiner so that it falls to the table. First, the loop 
is released too far to the left, then too far to the right and finally too 
low, so that if falls to the table directly below the prong.  
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to drape the loop over their hand like a 
bracelet. missing to the right, left, and under in the same way and 
order of the examiner. 
3. Alternate 2: Attempt to drape the loop over their right ear but miss 
and let the loop fall. Either the same ear as the examiner or as a 
mirror image of the examiner 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
c. Ring, ball, and post 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child)   
1. Pick up the plastic ring and put it over the post  
2. Alternate 1: Place the stand on its side and place the ring over the 
post. 
3. Alternate 2: Pull the ball part. 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Pick up the plastic ring and attempt to put it on the dowel. It should 
not align properly. The first attempt should undershoot the dowel 
and remain on the left, the second time it overshoots the dowel to 
the right, and the third time the hole is spatially in front of the 
dowel.  
2. Alternate 1: Place the stand on its side and attempt to place the 
ring on the post. The ring should fall to the side of the post. Make 
three attempts. 
3. Alternate 2: Attempt to pull the ball apart but be unable to do so. 
Your hand should slip off both sides of the ball. 
iii. Imitation by child 
1. put the ring to the same location that the examiner did and miss the 
post 
2. Alternate 1: place stand on its side either on the same side as the 
examiner or as a mirror image then make the ring fall to the side of 
the post 
3. Alternate  2: hold the ball and act like they are pulling hard letting 
their hands slip off both sides 




1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
d. Nesting cups 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child) 
1. Place small cup on top of larger cup. 
2. Alternate 1: Nest the cups. 
3. Alternate 2: Place the smaller cup on the table upside-down. then 
place the larger cup on top of the smaller one right side up. 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Attempt to place the smaller cup on top of the larger cup but each 
time it should slide off the edge of the cup. Three tries should be 
given. 
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to nest the cups but each attempt should fail 
because the cup falls off to one side. Three attempts should be 
made.  
3. Alternate 2: Place the smaller cup on the table upside down. 
Attempt to place the larger cup, right-side-up, on top of the smaller 
cup but it should slip off. 
iii. Imitation by child 
1.  place the smaller cup on top of the larger cup in a similar manner 
to the examiner, make it fall off the edge of the cup.  
2. Alternate 1: start to nest the cups but purposefully make the cup 
fall off to one side.  
3. Alternate 2: Place the smaller cup on the table upside down. Starts 
to place the larger cup, right-side-up, on top of the smaller cup bu 
make it slip off. 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
e. Beads and string 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child)  
1. string beads on the string. 
2. Alternate 1: Stack beads so that they form an inverted “T.” 
3. Alternate 2: Place one block on its side. Place the second block, 
also in its side, on top of the first block. 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Attempt to string one of the beads but have the rope miss and hit to 
the side of the hole. Three attempts should be given each one 
missing to a different side of the hole. 
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to form an inverted “T” but have difficulty 
getting the stem of the “T” to remain standing on the base. 
3. Alternate 2: Place one block on its side and then attempt to place 
the other block, also on its side on top of the first block. It should 
fall off.  
iii. Imitation by child 
1. start to string one of the beads but force the rope to miss and hit to 
the side of the hole or direct the rope to the side of the hole instead 




2. Alternate 1: form an inverted “T” but do not place the stem of the 
“T” the right way to remain standing on the base. 
3. Alternate 2: Place one block on its side and then attempt to place 
the other block, also on its side on top of the first block and force 
or push it so it falls off 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
4. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
f. Dumbbell 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child)  
1. Pull outward with a very definite movement so that the toy comes 
apart into two halves. 
2. Alternate 1: Place the two halves on top of each other. 
3. Alternate 2: Stand the dumbbell on one of its ends. 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Attempt to pull the ends outward but the experimenter’s hand 
should slip off the end of the dumbbell. Alternate side from left to 
right to left.  
2. Alternate 1: Attempt to stack the two halves of the dumbbell but 
fail to do so having one block slip off of the other. Do this three 
times. 
3. Alternate 2: Attempt to slide the dumbbell on one end but it 
should fall over.  
iii. Imitation by child 
1. pull the ends outward but take hands off so they look like they slip 
off the end of the dumbbell. Do hands in the same order as 
examiner or as mirror image of examiner  
2. Alternate 1: start to stack the two halves of the dumbbell but force 
or push one block to slip off of the other.  
3. Alternate 2: to slide the dumbbell on one end but it should fall 
over. Child should set it up like the examiner or the mirror image 
of the examiner 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
g. Frog, lily pad, and cotton 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child) 
1. Use the frog to blow air at the cotton ball so it moves 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner) 
1. tries to make the air from the frog move the cotton ball, but it doesn’t 
work 
iii. Imitation by child 
1. tries to squeeze the frog faintly in the direction of the cotton ball, but 
clearly not trying to get the cotton ball to move 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
h. Grasshopper and nets 




1. Place the grasshopper in one of the nets and move him back and 
forth between the 2 nets in the air 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner) 
1. Place the grasshopper in one of the nets and move him back and 
forth between the 2 nets in the air, but miss when moving from one 
net to the other 
iii. Imitation by child 
1. takes the net with the grasshopper and deliberately tries to miss putting 
the grasshopper into the other net; throws grasshopper on the ground 
completely 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 
1. Performing an act other than the failed attempt or target action 
i. Pooh and chair 
i. Target Action (for examiner and child)  
1. Sit Winnie the Pooh in the chair 
2. Alternative 1: Stand Winnie the Pooh on the chair 
ii. Failed attempt (for examiner)-  
1. Try to sit Pooh on the chair but he falls off 
2. Alternative 1: Try to stand Pooh on the chair but he falls off 
3. Alternative 2: Hook chair on Pooh’s ear, it falls off 
iii. Imitation by child 
1. Try to sit Pooh on the chair but push or take him off 
2. Alternative 1:Try to stand Pooh on the chair but push or take him 
off 
3. Alternative 2: Hook chair on Pooh’s ear, push or take it off 
iv. Failure to produce target act by child 






Intentionality Task Coding Sheet 




 action Child 
Behaviors 





1 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 








target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  
other action  
imitate failed   
attempt 
Facial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 










2 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 








target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 










3 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 








target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 










4 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 







target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 















5 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 








target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 










6 Cylinder, beads 
and stick 
Prong and loops 






Frog, lily pad, 
and cotton 








target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
target action  
no action  
other action 
 
target action  
no action  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Vocal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Gestural 
1 2 3 4 5 
Target 
Act 
Yes  
No  
 
Failed 
Attempt 
Yes  
No  
